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THE RAPE SHIELD PARADOX:
COMPLAINANT PROTECTION




In the past seventeen years, legislatures or courts in each of the
fifty states have enacted statutes,' composed rules of court,2 or au-
thored judicial opinions3 designed to protect rape complainants
from the psychological trauma associated with the public disclosure
I ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (Supp. 1986); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1986);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 1810.1-4 (Supp. 1985); CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 782, 1103 (West Supp.
1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86f (West
1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3508-09 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022 (West
Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-202.1 (Supp.1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (West 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3525 (Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.145 (Michie Bobbs-Merrill 1985);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 252
(Supp. 1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (Supp. 1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233,
§ 21B (Law. Co-op. 1986); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1987);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (Vernon Supp.
1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(4) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-321 (1984); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.069, 50.090 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6
(1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.1 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw
§ 60.42 (McKinney 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-14 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.02 (Baldwin Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 750 (West Supp. 1987); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-13 (1981); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-22-15
(1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp.
1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-67.7 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020 (Supp.
1986); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-12 (Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 904.04, 972.11 (West
1985); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-312 (1983).
2 HAW. R. EVID. 412 (1983); IDAHO R. EVID. 412 (1985); IowA R. EVID. 412 (1983);
Miss. R. EvID. 412 (1986); N.M. R. EVID. 413 (1978); N.C. R. EVID. 412 (Supp. 1985);
ORE. EvID. CODE, Rule 412 (1981); TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 412 (1986); UTAH R. EVID. 404
& 405 (1986).
3 State v. Reinhold, 123 Ariz. 50, 597 P.2d 532 (1979) (en banc).
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of the rape complainant's prior sexual activities and propensity for
unchastity. Consistent with this pattern of state action, Congress, in
1978, enacted Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which ex-
cludes from evidence all reputation and opinion testimony concern-
ing a rape complainant's prior sexual conduct, while allowing for
the limited admissibility of evidence of the complainant's specific
prior sexual acts.4 These evidentiary rules mark a sudden departure
from the lack of sensitivity traditionally accorded rape complainants
4 The Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540, 92 Stat.
2046 (1978), was signed into law on October 28, 1978, and, as FED. R. EvID. 412, applies
in all trials conducted after November 29, 1978. Rule 412 provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a
person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, reputation or
opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such rape or
assault is not admissible.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a
person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, evidence of a
victim's past sexual behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not
admissible, unless such evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence is -
(1) admitted in accordance with subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2) and is constitu-
tionally required to be admitted; or
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of -
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered by the
accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not, with respect to the
alleged victim, the source of semen or injury; or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the accused upon
the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual behavior with re-
spect to which rape or assault is alleged.
(c)(1) If the person accused of committing rape or assault with intent to com-
mit rape intends to offer under subdivision (b) evidence of specific instances of the
alleged victim's past sexual behavior, the accused shall make a written motion to
offer such evidence not later than fifteen days before the date on which the trial in
which such evidence is to be offered is scheduled to begin, except that the court may
allow the motion to be made at a later date, including during trial, if the court deter-
mines either that the evidence is newly discovered and could not have been ob-
tained earlier through the exercise of due diligence or that the issue to which such
evidence relates has newly arisen in the case. Any motion made under this para-
graph shall be served on all other parties and on the alleged victim.
(2) The motion described in paragraph (1) shall be accompanied by a writ-
ten offer of proof. If the court determines that the offer of proof contains evidence
described in subdivision (b), the court shall order a hearing in chambers to deter-
mine if such evidence is admissible. At such hearing the parties may call witnesses,
including the alleged victim, and offer relevant evidence. Notwithstanding subdivi-
sion (b) of rule 104, if the relevancy of the evidence which the accused seeks to offer
in the trial depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court, at the
hearing in chambers or at a subsequent hearing in chambers scheduled for such
purpose, shall accept evidence on the issue of whether such condition of fact is
fulfilled and shall determine such issue.
(3) If the court determines on the basis of the hearing described in para-
graph (2) that the evidence which the accused seeks to offer is relevant and that the
probative value of such evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, such
evidence shall be admissible in trial to the extent an order made by the court speci-
fies evidence which may be offered and areas with respect to which the alleged vic-
tim may be examined or cross-examined.
(d) For purposes of this rule, the term "past sexual behavior" means sexual
behavior other than the sexual behavior with respect to which rape or assault with
intent to commit rape is alleged.
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by early English and early American courts. 5
This Comment examines the disparate array of rape shield laws
hastily enacted by state legislatures in response to constituent pres-
sures. Such rape shield laws range from highly exclusionary rules 6
to broadly inclusive statutes. 7 After briefly reviewing the chronolog-
ical development of the evidentiary rules governing rape cases, this
Comment evaluates the effectiveness of such provisions. A focus on
the recent judicial trends of several state courts reveals that less
than cogent judicial opining, while purporting to comprehend the
recent legislative thrust advocating the protection of the integrity of
rape complainants, misconstrues the intent underlying the enact-
ment of rape shield laws. This Comment, through an analysis of the
trends ofjudicial decisions in several states, unveils a significant pat-
tern ofjudicial confusion as to the proper mode of interpretation of
5 From its inception, English common law provided that evidence of a rape com-
plainant's prior sexual history was always admissible. Gold & Wyatt, The Rape System:
Old Roles and New Times, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 695, 698-705 (1978); People v. Bastian, 330
Mich. 457, 47 N.W.2d 692 (1952) (statutory rape case allowing the admission of evi-
dence of the rape complainant's prior sexual conduct to establish nymphomania for the
purpose of impeachment).
6 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (West 1986). This statute prohibits the ad-
missibility of:
1. evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct,
2. evidence of the past sexual conduct of a witness other than the accused;
3. opinion evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct,
4. opinion evidence of the past sexual conduct of a witness other than the accused;
5. reputation evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct; and
6. reputation evidence of the past sexual conduct of a witness other than the
accused.
See also infra Tables IV & V, app.
7 See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-312 (1983), which provides:
(a) In any prosecution under W.S. 6-3-302 through 6-2-305 or for any lesser in-
cluded offense, if evidence of the prior sexual conduct of the victim, reputation
evidence or opinion evidence as to the character of the victim is to be offered the
following procedure shall be used:
(i) A written motion shall be made by the defendant to the court at least ten (10)
days prior to the trial stating that the defense has an offer of proof of the relevancy
of the evidence of the sexual conduct of the victim and its relevancy to the defense;
(ii) The written motion shall be accompanied by affidavits in which the offer of
proof is stated;
(iii) If the court finds the offer of proof sufficient, the court shall hold a hearing in
chambers, and at the hearing allow the questioning of the victim regarding the offer
of proof made by the defendant and allow pertinent evidence;
(iv) At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that the probative value of
the evidence substantially outweighs the probability that its admission will create
prejudice, the evidence shall be admissible pursuant to this section. The court may
make an order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant, which
order may include the nature of the questions to be permitted.
(b) This section does not limit the introduction of evidence as to prior sexual con-
duct of the victim with the actor.
(c) Any motion or affidavit submitted pursuant to this section is privileged infor-
mation and shall not be released or made available for public use or scrutiny in any
manner, including posttrial proceedings.
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rape shield laws. The examination focuses on five states which have
enacted rape shield laws representative of the vast array of statutes.
This Comment determines that the most functional rape shield laws
are those which foist judicial discretion upon the state courts while
simultaneously providing adequate legislative guidance. Implicit in
this survey is the recognition that state judiciaries often fall prey to
the fallacies8 underlying the traditional evidentiary analysis applied
in rape cases. The resulting opinions generally implicate a lesser
degree of protection for the rape complainant than can be recon-
ciled with state mandates. This Comment concludes that state
courts must make a more expansive reading of the legislative intent
underlying rape shield laws in order to effectuate the intended level
of protection for the rape complainant. State legislatures, more-
over, should aid state courts in this task by more clearly articulating
the purpose of the rape shield law evidentiary exclusion. The inevi-
table result, should state legislatures and courts fail to adequately
perform in their respective roles, is the unconscious emasculation of
the evidentiary protections that rape shield laws afford rape
complainants.
The recent change in the emphasis of rape shield laws traces its
origin to two societal phenomena which suggest that evidence relat-
ing to a rape complainant's character and prior sexual history car-
ries minimal probative value. First, the late 1960's and 1970's saw
the advent of a broad societal movement aimed at advancing the
rights and dignity of women. The resultant shift in social mores
provided the impetus to elicit legislative and judicial reform of the
treatment accorded rape complainants under existing laws. 9 Sec-
ondly, empirical studies over the past two decades advocating a
complainant-protective definition of rape supplemented the wo-
men's equality movement and played a large role in dispelling mis-
conceptions associated with the crime of rape.10
8 See infra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
9 State v. Reinhold, 123 Ariz. 50, 597 P.2d 532 (1979) (en banc); Bohmer &
Blumberg, Twice Traumatized: The Rape Victim and the Court, 58 JUDICATURE 391, 395
(1975) (supporting the enactment of rape shield laws by critiquing the traditional admis-
sibility of evidence of the complainant's reputation and past sexual history at trial as
being highly embarrassing and having a deep psychological effect); Hibley, The Trial of a
Rape Case: An Advocate's Analysis of Corroboration, Consent and Character, 11 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 309, 323 n.48 (1973) (noting the adverse effects upon the complainant of the barbs
and insinuations of defense counsel).
10 Recent psychological and sociological research characterizes rape as a crime of
violence rather than a crime of sex. See, e.g., A. GROTH, MEN WHO RAPE (1979). This
research has led some reformers to eliminate the consent element and define rape solely




As a result of these scientific and social endeavors, the new state
statutory and judicial pronouncements profoundly restrict the abil-
ity of the defendant to present evidence of a rape complainant's
prior sexual activities and propensity for unchastity for the purpose
of impeaching the complainant's credibility." These state provi-
sions, commonly labelled "rape shield laws," raise multiple consti-
tutional issues. 12 Rape shield laws potentially preclude defendants
charged with rape from exercising their sixth amendment right to
confront the complainant and other adverse witnesses.' 3 This lack
of confrontation, in turn, renders questionable the effective preser-
vation of the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 14 In addition to
constitutional questions, the ambiguous language of some rape
shield laws raises issues of vagueness.' 5 The wide variance in con-
tent and quality among rape shield laws complicates judicial re-
view 16 and forces courts to strain in interpreting sometimes
incomprehensible provisions. 17 Despite these fundamental con-
cerns, rape shield laws have survived multiple constitutional chal-
lenges in state courts.' 8 Nevertheless, these exclusionary provisions
may yield to significant state interests in order to preserve the trial
process. 19 In light of these developments, rape shield laws continue
11 The term "character" encompasses two distinct concepts. One focus is upon the
complainant's disposition-trait, group of traits, or the sum of her traits. The second
emphasis examines how the community perceives reputation of character. IA J. WiG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 52 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983). Opinion testimony, reputation evidence,
and evidence of prior sexual conduct are the three principal means of establishing a
witness' pertinent character traits, such as unchastity. Opinion testimony is "testimony
by a witness who is familiar with the person in question and who can state his opinion
whether the subject has a certain character trait." G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
Law OF EVIDENCE 102 (1978). Reputation evidence is "evidence of the subject's commu-
nity reputation for possessing the character trait in question." Id. "Chastity" refers to
an unmarried person's abstention from unlawful sexual intercourse with another per-
son. State v. Brionez, 188 Neb. 488, 490, 197 N.W.2d 639, 640 (1972). For married
persons, "chastity" refers to the abstention from extramarital sexual intercourse. State
v. Bird, 302 So. 2d 589, 592 (La. 1974).
12 See, e.g., State v. Davis, 269 N.W.2d 434 (Iowa 1978). See also infra note 80 and
accompanying text.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides, in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.. ." The
sixth amendment confrontation clause was held applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides, in part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ......
15 See, e.g., People v. Blackburn, 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1976).
16 See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020 (Supp. 1986).
18 See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
19 The Supreme Court of the United States has employed a balancing test to weigh
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to pose a significant constitutional issue2° and, in many cases, para-
doxically signal a regression toward the Victorian posture allowing
for the unlimited admissibility of evidence of a rape complainant's
prior sexual activity and propensity for unchastity.2 1
II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF RAPE EVIDENTIARY RULES
The earliest codifications of ancient law recognized the crime of
rape.2 2 In prosecutions for sex offenses, DeanJohn Henry Wigmore
forcefully argued for the full admissibility of evidence concerning
the rape complainant's character and evidence of her prior sexual
conduct. 23 English rules had previously acceded to this position,
providing that such evidence was always admissible. 24 Dean Wig-
more's attitude reflected a rudimentary fear of baseless criminal
prosecutions which required careful scrutiny of the credibility of the
rape complainant.2 5 This perspective also reflected the expectation
of males of this generation that women would remain chaste until
marriage.2 6
Three elements underlying the prevailing moral climate in the
these conflicting interests, noting that when an evidentiary rule results in the "denial of
or significant diminution" of the right to confront, the competing state interests will be
closely examined. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
20 Even a staunch proponent of rape shield laws concedes that scenarios exist in
which evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct may be so probative of the
defendant's guilt that it cannot constitutionally be withheld from the jury. Comment,
Federal Rule of Evidence 412: Was the Change an Improvement?, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 244, 250
(1980).
21 See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
22 The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, dating from approximately 1900 B.C.E., de-
fined a series of crimes involving lying with women who were betrothed or married to
others. The Code provided that "the man shall be put to death and that women shall go
free." Approximately one thousand years after the Code of Hammurabi, a set of laws
relating to rape and adultery appeared in Deuteronomy as part of the laws of Moses.
Deuteronomy 22: 23-27. The laws provided that a woman raped in the city is punished
greatly, and both she and the perpetrator shall die. A woman raped "in the field," un-
like the woman of Babylon, goes free due to the difficulty of proving resistance. Gold &
Wyatt, supra note 5, at 696-98.
23 IAJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 62 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983).
24 Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L.
Rav. 544, 546 (1980).
25 Id. Wigmore referred to the overall credibility of the complainant in society-not
merely her credibility as a witness in the courtroom.
26 Indeed, these laws accorded with the male-dominated view of society of this era.
Males viewed women as personal property. Rape evidence laws, therefore, developed
more from the male need to protect property rights than from a chivalrous desire to
protect women. Women who were not virgins were considered damaged and were
scorned by society. Men who inflicted such injury were, thus, subject to severe penalties.
This historical perspective explains the dichotomy between the high value placed on
virginity and the difficult burden that a woman faced in proving a rape charge. See Gold
& Wyatt, supra note 5, at 696-705.
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Victorian era contributed to this position. First, the male-domi-
nated society feared that vindictive women would perpetuate false
rape charges against innocent men.2 7 As Sir Matthew Hale, Lord
ChiefJustice of the King's Bench, stated, "rape is an accusation easy
to be made, hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the
party accused though ever so innocent." 28  Dean Wigmore, in the
extreme, suggested that rape complainants submit to a psychiatric
examination before trial in order to determine whether the charges
were the product of a psychological predisposition for fabrication. 29
Second, society conceptualized chastity as a character trait.30 Fi-
nally, society believed that premarital sex was immoral. 31 The Vic-
torian era, in general, exhibited a pervading concern for the welfare
of the male members of society with little regard for females.
In contrast, modem commentators have shifted their emphasis
away from the protection of males. Instead of attempting to shelter
men from potential fabricated rape charges, the contemporary focus
perceives chastity evidence as relevant to the determination of the
guilt of the accused, consent to the act in question, and the im-
peachment of the complainant's credibility. 32 Such analyses fre-
quently evaluate rape shield laws in the context of sixth amendment
and due process concerns. 33
27 Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 24, at 546.
28 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634, 635 (1st Am. ed. Phila-
delphia 1847).
29 Wigmore feared that women, having a psychological disposition to "imaginary and
false charges," needed the countervailing effect of the admissibility of character evi-
dence as protection. IAJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 62 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983).
30 Implying that if a woman could be shown to be unchaste by nature, it could be
inferred that she consented to sex with the defendant. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note
24, at 546.
31 Acts of previous illicit sexual relations could be used to impeach the credibility of
both married and unmarried complainants in rape cases. Id.
32 Professor Berger has articulated seven types of evidence that, subject to judicial
findings of relevance and fairness, the defendant should be allowed to introduce: (1) Ev-
idence of the complainant's sexual conduct with the defendant; (2) evidence of specific
instances of conduct to show that someone other than the accused caused the physical
condition (semen, pregnancy, disease) allegedly arising from the act; (3) evidence of a
distinctive pattern of conduct closely resembling the defendant's version of the encoun-
ter in order to prove consent; (4) evidence of prior sexual conduct known to the defend-
ant (presumably by reputation) tending to prove that he believed the complainant was
consenting; (5) evidence showing a motive to fabricate the charge; (6) evidence that
rebuts proof offered by the state on the complainant's sexual conduct; and (7) evidence
as the basis for expert testimony that the complainant fantasized the act. Berger, Man's
Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases In The Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 98-99
(1977).
33 See infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
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III. THE MODERN PROGRESSION TOWARD RAPE SHIELD LAWS
Over the past two decades, scholarly literature has often at-
tacked the traditional evidentiary rules governing the admissibility
of evidence in rape cases. 34 Commentators have dismissed views
shared by Dean Wigmore and the men of his era as chauvinistic ut-
terances in light of the growing social awareness generated by the
women's equality movement.3 5 In addition, media critics exposed
the mistreatment often accorded rape complainants by the criminal
justice system.3 6 These views rapidly led to an erosion of support
for the Victorian myth that an unchaste woman is more likely to en-
gage in indiscriminate sexual activity than a virtuous woman. The
impact of such efforts led most jurisdictions to repeal the automatic
admission of character evidence and, concomitantly, to implement
rape shield laws. 37
In addition to public sentiment, empirical data helped decay the
rationale underlying the traditional English rule of unlimited admis-
sibility. Sir Matthew Hale's concern for the impact of fabricated
rape charges carries little statistical significance today.38 The dan-
ger of false rape charges does not exceed the potential for the
fabrication of any other type of allegation.3 9 In fact, rape continues
to be one of the most underreported crimes; some studies estimate
that as many as eighty percent of all rapes go unreported.40 More-
over, elaborate police and prosecutorial screening techniques elimi-
nate a high percentage of unfounded rape charges prior to trial.4 1
34 See, e.g., Gold & Wyatt, supra note 5; Note, THE VICTIM IN A FORCIBLE RAPE CASE:
A FEMINIST VIEW, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 335 (1973); Note, Rape Reform Legislation: Is It the
Solution?, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 463 (1975); Note, If She Consented Once, She Consented Again:
A Legal Fallacy in Forcible Rape Cases, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 127 (1975).
35 The majority of rape shield statutes were enacted in 1975, coinciding with Interna-
tional Women's Year. The goal of International Women's Year was to prevent human
rights violations against women, including rape. REPORT OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR 7 (1976).
36 See, e.g., S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL (1975) (focusing public attention on
the treatment of rape victims by the judicial system).
37 See sources cited supra notes 1-2.
38 See, e.g., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE
UNrrED STATES 24 (1975)(estimating that, as a national average, fifteen percent of all
forcible rapes reported to police were determined to be unfounded); Comment, Police
Discretion and the Judgment That a Crime Has Been Committed-Rape in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA.
L. REV. 277, 280-81 (1968)(observing that, in Philadelphia, twenty percent of all rapes
reported were determined to be unfounded upon police investigation). Cf. The Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration ofJustice, Task Force Re-
port: Crime and Its Impact-An Assessment 25 (1967)(stating that some police
departments conclude that fifty percent of all forcible rape complaints are unfounded).
39 Id.; Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 24, at 547.
40 Id.
41 See Rudstein, Rape Shield Laws: Some Constitutional Problems, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV.
COMMENT
Such information provided additional impetus to the movement to
reform evidentiary rules respecting rape proceedings.
Legislative and judicial recognition of changing social norms
played a pivotal role in the reform of rape evidentiary rules. Today,
an increasing number of women engage in premarital or extramari-
tal relationships. 42 This behavior bears no correlation to the likeli-
hood that women who engage in these types of relationships more
frequently consent indiscrimately to sex than do women who refrain
from such conduct.43 Both legislators and judges recognize that
these changing social mores bear no significant connection with the
issue of female consent.44 This realization erodes much of the foun-
dation underlying the traditional evidentiary rules governing cases
involving rape. Moreover, reputation and opinion evidence is most
often used to establish the character of the rape complainant.45
These types of evidence are the least accurate methods of establish-
ing that a rape complainant casually chooses sexual partners. 46 Rec-
ognition of this shortcoming further undermines the credibility of
the arguments advanced by proponents of adherence to traditional
evidentiary rules in rape proceedings.
IV. CATEGORIZATION OF RAPE SHIELD LAws
Many significant syntactical differences exist among state rape
shield laws. 47 These divergences, when analyzed concordantly with
the enormous amount of publicity given to the women's equality
movement, intimate that the state legislatures responsible for the
enactment of these statutes and rules failed to adequately compre-
hend the complexity of the task of formulating such provisions. In
general, the result is a set of poorly-drafted and ambiguous stat-
utes.48 For example, certain laws focus on the use of evidence of
1, 27-28 n.109 (1976) (stating that it is commonly known that prosecutors pursue only
those rape cases in which there is a strong probability of conviction and that they are
willing to accept a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, such as battery, if the chances for a
conviction for rape are small).
42 See M. HUNT, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 1970's 149-55 (1976).
43 Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 24, at 548.
44 Id.
45 IIIAJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 920 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
46 See, e.g., People v. Benson, 6 Cal. 221, 223 (1856) (stating that general reputation
is an insufficient substitute for particular facts).
47 See sources cited supra notes 1-2.
48 IA J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 62 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983). See also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 794.022 (West Supp. 1987). The language of § 794.022 potentially implies that evi-
dence of prior sexual activity between the complainant and third persons is only admissi-
ble in regards to the issue of consent. Such an interpretation may also relate to
reputation and opinion evidence.
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prior sexual conduct for testimonial impeachment purposes while
neglecting the issue of whether such evidence is probative on the
issue of consent by the complainant.49 Likewise, some provisions
explicitly permit the use of evidence of prior sexual conduct by the
complainant to prove consent while failing to consider the admissi-
bility of such evidence to establish the defendant's reasonable belief
in consent.50 In addition, several statutes initially imply a total ex-
clusion of certain types of evidence while later ambiguously qualify-
ing this position.5 1 Even if such exclusion is unqualified, the statute
may be rendered inadvertently overinclusive since the inadmissible
evidence may be relevant to the interaction that is the basis of the
criminal charge. 52 These examples are merely representative of the
numerous linguistic and substantive nuances implicated by the va-
garies of state rape shield laws. State courts, therefore, are often
required to employ considerable ingenuity when construing such
poorly-drafted provisions. 53
Despite the sweeping differences among state rape shield laws,
the statutes and rules of court are cognizable into five broad classifi-
cations: (1) laws that generally prohibit the introduction of sexual
history evidence, except in limited circumstances; (2) laws that gen-
erally prohibit sexual history evidence, except in a few specifically
defined situations, and even then only after a hearing to determine
admissibility; (3) laws that admit sexual history evidence under
traditional evidence rules requiring that relevance outweigh prejudi-
cial effect; (4) laws that generally allow sexual history evidence, but
require a hearing on admissibility for some uses of this evidence;
and (5) laws that give the trial judge general discretion to admit sex-
ual history evidence, but limit such discretion in certain circum-
stances. 54 A majority of the new evidentiary provisions forego the
traditional position articulated by Dean Wigmore in favor of pre-
sumptive inadmissibility. 55 The degree of restriction varies greatly
49 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3509 (1979); N.D. CENr. CODE § 12.1-20-1
(1985).
50 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020 (Supp. 1986): TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-
17-119 (1982).
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (1986).
53 See, e.g., State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 426 A.2d 457 (198 1)(determining that due
process required the admission of evidence of prior consensual activity between the
complainant and a third person in contravention of the "plain meaning" of the New
Hampshire statute).
54 See Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 24, at 548; see also infra app.




among jurisdictions. 56 The first grouping of rape shield laws pur-
ports to prohibit the introduction of character and sexual history
evidence except in certain enumerated circumstances. 57 These laws
do not involve judicial discretion and do not distinguish between
types of evidence. The second category of rape shield laws prohib-
its the introduction of propensity and conduct evidence, except for
certain enumerated purposes after a pre-trial or an in camera hear-
ing to determine issues of relevance and prejudicial effect. 58 The
great bulk of statutes fall into the second classification.
At the other extreme are rape shield laws more closely attuned
to the historical position recognizing the substantial probity of evi-
dence of a rape complainant's prior sexual activity and propensity
for unchastity. A small group of statutes compose the third classifi-
cation, which allows for the admissibility of such evidence merely on
a showing of relevance and admissibility under the traditional evi-
dentiary standard requiring that relevance outweigh prejudicial ef-
fect.59 The fourth series of rape shield laws generally permits the
admissibility of such evidence, but requires a hearing to determine
the appropriate uses.60 These statutes again apply the traditional
evidentiary standard governing admissibility. Finally, the fifth cate-
gory of rape shield laws employs the traditional evidentiary standard
but allows the trial judge discretion in limited enumerated situa-
tions. 6' These areas usually include issues of consent and
impeachment. 62
In theory, then, two polar formulations of rape shield laws ex-
ist. Many rape shield laws adhere closely to the position of Dean
Wigmore and support the unlimited admissibility of evidence of a
rape complainant's propensity to engage in sexual conduct and
prior sexual history. At the other extreme are rape shield laws
which dictate a complete ban on the use of propensity and conduct
evidence, subject to a few enumerated exceptions. Most formula-
tions, however, fall into the intermediate gradations which combine
variants of the two approaches. The tension between highly exclu-
sionary rape shield laws and provisions which liberally admit evi-
56 See infra app. The appendix is modeled after tables contained in Tanford &
Bocchino, supra note 24, at 591-602.
57 See infra Table IV, app.
58 See infra Table V, app.
59 See infra Table I, app.
60 See infra Table II, app.
61 See infra Table III, app.
62 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 3508 (1979) (limit on consent); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 48.069 (Michie 1986) (limit on impeachment).
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dence poses the most severe problems for state courts in attempting
to administer justice evenhandedly.
V. POTENTIAL INFIRMITIES IMPLICATED By RAPE
SHIELD LAW DIVERGENCES
A. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
As previously emphasized, rape shield laws present enormous
interpretational difficulties for both state and federal courts. In par-
ticular, statutes which explicitly prohibit the admission of evidence
of a rape complainant's personal propensities or evidence of prior
sexual activity63 are most problematic. These rape shield laws di-
rectly contravene the defendant's constitutional right to confronta-
tion.64 This implicit limitation upon cross-examination improperly
abridges the defendant's right to fully confront his accuser. The
fundamental concern of thejudiciary-to administer justice in a fair
and impartial manner-may compel courts to formulate exceptions
to explicit statutory prohibitions in order to preserve the consitu-
tional guarantees of the defendant. 65 The majority of decisions,
however, support the fact that state courts often find it impossible to
satisfactorily resolve evidentiary difficulties through a literal reading
of a rape shield law.66 Courts often feel obligated to consider the
broader purposes of the statute in order to formulate an appropri-
ate solution. Judicial activism, however, in a super-legislative capac-
ity creates enormous conceptual problems for statutory
interpretation as well as separation of powers concerns. 67 State
courts may be guilty of openly infringing upon the legislative func-
tion by contravening the expressed intentions of the drafters of stat-
utes and rules of court. Yet, ex ante, responsibility for this situation
lies fully with the state legislatures. Incomprehensible rape shield
laws enhance the possibility that judicial interpretations may contra-
dict the legislative intent underlying such provisions. In addition to
ambiguity, the absence of comprehensive indicia of legislative his-
tory at the state level compounds the task of judicial interpretation.
It is evident from the context and structure of many state rape shield
63 See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (1986).
64 See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
65 See, e.g., State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 426 A.2d 457 (1981)(defendant given the
right to demonstrate that due process requires the admission of evidence of the com-
plainant's prior sexual activity and was to be afforded the opportunity to present testi-
mony concerning the victim's allegedly decadent sexual environment).




laws that the state legislatures did not possess a fundamental knowl-
edge of the substantative and procedural goals of the enactments.
A cogent illustration of this difficulty is the existence of rape
shield laws which purport to prohibit or severely restrict the admis-
sibility of evidence of the prior sexual history of the complainant
with persons other than the accused, while allowing evidence of the
complainant's prior sexual activity with the defendant.68 Many of
these statutes contain an express prohibition on the admissibility of
reputation or opinion evidence. 69 Implicit in such a statutory
scheme is the intention to exclude extraneous, non-probative evi-
dence. As previously noted, however, no statistically significant cor-
relation exists between an individual's conduct on a particular
occasion and those sexual propensities. 70 These statutes, in accord-
ance with the goals of society, attempt to reconcile the competing
interests of justice and personal privacy.
Under these rape shield laws, it is unclear whether evidence of
the complainant's relationships with third persons is presumptively
or automatically inadmissible when offered to rebut evidence that
she had never engaged in intercourse prior to the alleged rape. In
this situation, evidence of the complainant's sexual history with
third persons is relevant to the issue of her credibility. Extremely
restrictive rape shield laws7' literally prohibit the admission of such
evidence to establish the veracity of the complainant. This result
portends for serious sixth amendment and due process implications
for the defendant.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES
During the second half of the 1970's and early 1980's, a consid-
erable and growing body of literature surfaced suggesting the pres-
ence of constitutional infirmities in rape shield laws. 72
Commentators identifying these problems gleaned much of their
support from the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
Chambers v. Mississippi7 and Davis v. Alaska.74 In Chambers, the
68 IAJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 62 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983).
69 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp. 1986).
70 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
72 See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 14,666 and Other Bills Before the Criminal Justice Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on theJudiciay, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65 (1976); Herman, What's W1rong
With the Rape Reform Laws?, 3 Civ. LIB. REV. 544 (1976); Tanford & Bocchino, supra note
24, at 550 (sixth amendment).
73 410 U.S. 284 (1973). Chambers involved a defendant charged with shooting a po-
lice officer. Another man, McDonald, admitted to defense attorneys that he had shot the
policeman, and he had, on three occasions, made similar confessions to friends. When
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United States Supreme Court, reversing the defendant's conviction,
held that the application of the evidentiary rules precluding the de-
fendant from introducing evidence in his behalf and from impeach-
ing his own witness rendered the trial fundamentally unfair and
denied the defendant due process of law. 75 In Davis, the United
States Supreme Court held that preventing the defendant's attorney
from cross-examining a witness violated the confrontation clause of
the sixth amendment. 76 In reversing the defendant's conviction, the
Court emphasized that "whatever temporary embarrassment might
result to Green or his family by disclosure of his juvenile record...
is outweighed by petitioner's right to probe into the influence of
possible bias on the testimony of a crucial identification witness." '77
Commentators rely on Chambers and Davis for the proposition
that a state cannot exclude probative evidence crucial to the defense
of an accused without violating the accused's right of confrontation
and right to due process of law.78 This translates into the postulate
that a state's policy interest in protecting a rape complainant from
trauma or embarrassment does not outweigh the defendant's right
to produce evidence in his own behalf or to confront a witness. A
restrictive rape shield law may similarly deny the defendant the op-
portunity to engage fully in direct and cross-examination. This de-
nial effectively abridges the constutionally preserved right to
confrontation.79 Given this extrapolation, the constitutionality of
called as a defense witness at trial, however, McDonald denied committing the murder
and recanted his prior confession. Because of Mississippi's "voucher" rule, which pro-
hibits a party from impeaching his own witness, and because Mississippi did not recog-
nize an exception to the hearsay rule for declarations against penal interest, the
defendant was unable to introduce evidence of McDonald's alleged out-of-court confes-
sions to his friends. Thejury convicted the defendant and sentenced him to life impris-
onment. Id.
74 415 U.S. 308 (1974). Davis involved a defendant charged with breaking into a
tavern and stealing a safe containing cash and checks. The primary evidence introduced
against the defendant was the testimony of Green, a juvenile, who was on probation
after having been adjudicated a delinquent for committing two acts of burglary. A court
rule aimed at preserving the confidentiality of juvenile adjudications for delinquency
precluded the defendant from impeaching Green by establishing that Green's identifica-
tion of the defendant might have been motivated out of fear of possible probation revo-
cation. Id.
75 410 U.S. at 294. The Court prefaced its decision by enunciating that "[t]he right
of the accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportu-
nity to defend against the State's accusations. The right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have been recognized as essential to
due process." Id.
76 415 U.S. at 317. The Court stated that "[t]he accuracy and truthfulness of Green's
testimony were key elements in the State's case against the petitioner." Id.
77 Id. at 319-20.
78 See Rudstein, Rape Shield Laws: Some Constitutional Problems, supra note 41, at 18.
79 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
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rape shield laws is called into question.
Nevertheless, rape shield laws have generally withstood a vari-
ety of constitutional challenges.80 Courts have shown some willing-
ness to fashion judicially-created exceptions to rape shield laws in
order to allow effective cross-examination and testimonial impeach-
ment on behalf of defendants in rape cases.81
Legislative and judicial pronouncements purport to display the
sound rationale underlying the rejection of the traditional eviden-
tiary stance permitting the unlimited admissibility of evidence of the
complainant's sexual propensities and her sexual history in rape
cases.8 2 Yet, the recognition that evidence of a complainant's prior
sexual activity and propensity for unchastity may contain a degree of
probative value creates a volatile environment which both the legis-
latures and the judiciary are ill-equipped to handle. The resulting
uncertainty may foster an environment which blurs the purpose of
recent reforms. Accordingly, both legislatures and courts may em-
bark on a course which unknowingly obscures the intended goals of
rape shield laws.
VI. OBJECTIVES OF RAPE SHIELD LAWS
Rape shield laws serve an important symbolic function by pro-
tecting the rape complainant from the trauma associated with the
public disclosure of evidence of her sexual propensities and her
prior sexual activity. The difficulties legislatures face in formulating
rape shield laws reflect the complex interactions between society's
positive and normative assessments of the relevancy and probity of
sexual history evidence. Foremost in this analysis is the tension be-
80 See, e.g., Marion v. State, 267 Ark. 345, 590 S.W.2d 288 (1979)(rape shield laws
represent no abridgement of sixth amendment right to confrontation); Dorn v. State,
267 Ark. 365, 590 S.W.2d 297 (1979)(rape shield statute does not violate equal protec-
tion clause)(citing United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1978)); People v. Mc-
Kenna, 196 Colo. 367, 585 P.2d 275 (1978) (rejecting claim that legislative enactment of
rape shield law violates the doctrine of separation of powers); State v. Williams, 224
Kan. 468, 580 P.2d 1341 (1978)(attack on requirement of pre-trial notice rejected; no
violation of due process); Smith v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978)(upholding constitutionality of rape shield law's prohibition against evidence of
sexual relations between complainant and third persons).
81 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carty, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 793, 397 N.E.2d 1138
(1979) (holding that the failure to permit the defendant to inquire into the complainant's
juvenile record to establish her probationary status in order to support the inference
that the complainant was motivated to fabricate the rape charge to conceal the nature of
her activities violated the right to confrontation pursuant to the sixth amendment);
Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 24, at 553 (citing Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547, 585 (1892)("[L]egislation cannot abridge a constitutional privilege.")).
82 See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
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tween the constitutional privileges8 3 of both the rape complainant
and the defendant.
The complexity and intricacies of rape shield laws have also
percolated a second layer of confrontation-that between state leg-
islatures and state courts. In an attempt to placate proponents of
competing concerns, superfluous legislative amendments and crea-
tive judicial opining have burgeoned. These amendments range
from mere stylistic changes8 4 to substantive alterations.8 5 Of
greater concern than legislative enactments are judicial opinions
which are forced to interpret the sometimes obscure intent underly-
ing rape shield laws. Though well-intentioned in praising the pur-
pose of such provisions, the judiciary may unknowingly compromise
the integrity of rape complainants at the expense of constitutional
concerns for the defendant. The sections below explore the impli-
cations of several such decisions.
VII. JUDICIAL MISPERCEPTIONS
A. NEW HAMPSHIRE
New Hampshire's rape shield law provides, in pertinent part,
that "[p]rior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any
person other than the actor shall not be admitted into evidence in
any prosecution under this chapter."8 6 Through the enactment of
this rape shield statute, the New Hampshire Legislature offered a
seemingly clear enunciation of its intent with respect to the admissi-
bility of evidence of a rape complainant's prior sexual activity with
third persons. Despite this apparent clarity, the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire's initial analysis of the New Hampshire rape shield
law imputed an elastic reading into the statute in State v. Howard.8 7
In Howard, the defendant was charged with having sexual relations
with a twelve-year-old girl.88 Defense counsel made several offers of
83 As discussed above, the defendant enjoys the sixth amendment right to confront
witnesses and the right to due process of law as included in the fourteenth amendment.
The complainant, however, has the directly competing right to privacy through the four-
teenth amendment. These constitutional privileges create an inherent tension between
the two parties to an adjudication.
84 See IOWA R. EVID. 412 (1983), which parallels the federal rule except that it applies
to all cases of "sexual abuse," rather than rape alone.
85 N.C. R. EvID. 412 (Supp. 1985)(change from admitting all evidence to admitting
evidence which refers to past conduct between the complainant and the defendant, evi-
dence which reveals a distinct pattern of sexual behavior, or an expert psychiatric
opinion).
86 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (1986).
87 121 N.H. 53, 426 A.2d 457.
88 Id. at 55, 426 A.2d at 458. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to limit
testimony regarding the complainant's prior sexual activity. Id., 426 A.2d at 458.
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proof in direct contravention of New Hampshire's rape shield stat-
ute.89 At the outset of its analysis, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire examined the constitutionality of the New Hampshire
rape shield statute.90 The court noted the propriety of the statute's
purpose, namely, to protect rape complainants. 91 Moreover, the
court acknowledged that a nationwide inquiry into procedures his-
torically used in rape trials produced a nearly unanimous consensus
that drastic revisions were necessary in order to afford the requisite
protection to the complainant. 92
Despite this pervasive sentiment, the court questioned the va-
lidity of implementing such sweeping reforms.93 The court framed
the issue of the validity of the New Hampshire rape shield statute as
one of serious constitutional importance.94 Focusing on the con-
frontation clause of the sixth amendment, the court held that in or-
der to uphold the constitutionality of the New Hampshire rape
shield statute, the defendant, upon motion, must be given an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate that due process requires the admission of
evidence when the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect
on the complainant. 95 The court also intimated that the questioned
testimony, when balanced against the protection of the privacy of
the complainant, may be found relevant and admissible at the dis-
cretion of the trial judge.9 6
89 Id. at 55, 426 A.2d at 458. The defense alleged that the testimony would reveal:
the complainant had sex with her father and grandfather, the latter in exchange for
money; the complainant lived with a man who was not her husband; a Nashua police
report contained allegations of sexual contact between the complainant and the Ed-
wards brothers; and the complainant had engaged in sexual activities with others while
being shown on closed circuit television. Id., at 426 A.2d at 458.
90 Id. at 57, 426 A.2d at 459-60. The court stated that it remained "mindful of the
legislative intent of the statute which obviously is to protect the victims of rape from
being subjected to the unnecessary embarrassment, prejudice, and courtroom proce-
dures that only serve to exacerbate the trauma of the rape itself." Id.
91 Id. at 57, 426 A.2d at 460 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)).
92 Id. at 57, 426 A.2d at 460.
93 Id., 426 A.2d at 460. The court recognized that forty-six jurisdictions at that time
had adopted some form of rape shield law. Thirty of these jurisdictions had adopted
restrictive provisions with the option of an in camera hearing to determine the relevancy
of such evidence. Id.
94 Id. at 57-58, 426 A.2d at 460 (citing Tanford and Bocchino, supra note 24, at 577-
83). The court recognized that the New Hampshire statute purports to prohibit com-
pletely the complainant's consensual activity with persons other than the defendant.
This prohibition, however, cannot limit the sixth amendment right to confrontation. Id.,
426 A.2d at 460.
95 Id. at 58, 426 U.S. at 460-61 ("[T]here are some cases in which the reputation of
the prosecutrix and in which specific prior sexual history may become relevant and its
probative value outweigh[s] the detrimental impact of its introduction." (citing State v.
Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1263-64 (Utah 1980))).
96 Id. at 59, 426 A.2d at 462.
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Several infirmities exist within the Howard court's conceptual
framework. In 1973, the United States Supreme Court recognized
that a person's consensual heterosexual sexual activity is a right of
personal privacy which is afforded a measure of protection under
the Constitution.9 7 The court's preoccupation in Howard with due
process and sixth amendment concerns resulted in the failure to ad-
equately consider the wide variance of legislative responses in ad-
dressing constitutional issues. Accordingly, the court gave little
merit to the fact that sixteen jurisdictions had not provided a pre-
trial or in camera mechanism for judicial review.9 8
More peculiar is the court's intimated application of the tradi-
tional evidentiary balancing standard to the complainant's sexual
propensities and her prior sexual activity.9 9 The court's focus in
Howard upon the rights of the defendant completely neglects the
legislative intent to drastically limit these privileges. Moreover, the
court ignores the fact that several states do not employ the "rele-
vance outweigh prejudice" standard.'0 0 Additionally, the New
Hampshire rape shield statute facially excludes all prior consensual
sexual activity between the complainant and third persons. Though
the court couches its discussion in terms of the protection of the
fundamental rights of the defendant, there is little analysis of the
intent of the New Hampshire Legislature in enacting the rape shield
statute.101 The court's implicit reliance upon antiquated societal
views with little or no empirical support results in an outcome inap-
posite to the thrust of the prior two decades.' 0 2 This rationale im-
parts an unwarranted regression towards the traditional posture of
unlimited admissibility of sexual history evidence premised on long-
outmoded considerations.10 3 The super-legislative function under-
taken by the court scratches the outer bounds of the doctrine of sep-
aration of powers and implicates an unmerited reduction in the
97 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
98 121 N.H. at 57, 426 A.2d at 460.
99 Id. at 58, 426 A.2d at 460. The traditional evidentiary standard is where "rele-
vance outweighs prejudicial effect." The court states that "the admission of... reputa-
tion and... specific prior sexual activity... may become relevant when the probative
value outweigh[s] the detrimental impact of its introduction." Id., 426 A.2d at 460.
100 See infra app.
101 Indeed, the only discussion of legislative intent by the Howard court stated that the
New Hampshire rape shield law "obviously is to protect the victims of rape from being
subjected to unnecessary embarrassment, prejudice and courtroom procedures that only
serve to exacerbate the trauma of the rape itself." 121 N.H. at 57, 426 A.2d at 459. The
court's analysis summarily ignored this proposition.
102 See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
103 121 N.H. at 61,426 A.2d at 462 ("[A] defendant must be afforded the opportunity
to show, by specific incidents of sexual conduct, that the prosecutrix has the experience
and ability to contrive a statutory rape charge against him.").
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protection of the fundamental right of privacy properly afforded to
rape complainants.
Seven months later, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire re-
affirmed and expanded the framework of Howard in State v. La
Clair.10 4 La Clair involved a defendant's appeal of his conviction for
aggravated felonious sexual assault. 10 5 The defendant contended
that the trial court improperly denied him the opportunity to cross-
examine the complainant with respect to inconsistent statements
that she had made regarding whether she was a virgin at the time of
the alleged rape.10 6 The trial court, relyiuig on the text of the New
Hampshire rape shield statute, ruled that the defendant was pre-
cluded from submitting evidence of sexual activity between the com-
plainant and any person other than the defendant. 10 7
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reaffirmed the rationale
of Howard and reversed the trial court, holding that, "despite the
literal language of the [New Hampshire rape shield] statute, the...
defendant . . .must, upon motion, be given an opportunity to
demonstrate that due process requires the admission of... evidence
[concerning] the past sexual activities of the [complainant] because
the probative value . . .[of the evidence] outweighs its prejudicial
effect on the prosecutrix [sic]." 10 8 The court stated further that the
effect of Howard "is to make evidence of a prosecutrix's [sic] prior
sexual activity with persons other than the defendant admissible
when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, determines that
due process so requires."' 0 9
The court concluded that the complainant issued inconsistent
statements regarding her virginity. 10 In remanding the case to the
superior court for a retrial, the court stated that "[b]ecause the prej-
udice to the prosecutrix [sic] resulting from the disclosure that she
may not have been a virgin at the time of the alleged rape is mini-
mal, the defendant must be afforded the opportunity to cross-ex-
104 State v. La Clair, 121 N.H. 743, 433 A.2d 1326 (1981).
105 Id. at 744, 433 A.2d at 1328. The court's opinion gives a limited recount of the
facts. The state's case involved the testimony of a physician who examined the com-
plainant between 8:30 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. on the night of the alleged rape and found
semen in her vagina. The physician's medical opinion was that the complainant had had
intercourse within hours of the examination. Id. at 747, 433 A.2d at 1329.
106 Id., 433 A.2d at 1329.
107 Id., 433 A.2d at 1329.
108 Id., 433 A.2d at 1329 (citing State v. Howard, 121 N.H. at 58-59, 426 A.2d at 461).
109 Id. at 745, 433 A.2d at 1328.
1 10 Id. at 745, 433 A.2d at 1329. The complainant allegedly told the investigating law
enforcement officer that she had been a virgin prior to the alleged attack. Under oath at
a later deposition, the complainant indicated that she had not been a virgin prior to the
alleged attack. Id., 433 A.2d at 1329.
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amine her concerning her inconsistent statements."' I t
Though purporting to reaffirm the rationale of Howard, La Clair
broadly expands the judicial discretion of the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire. For the first time, the court, in direct contraven-
tion of the statutory language, explicitly acknowledged that the sex-
ual activities of a complainant immediately prior to an alleged rape
may be an appropriate area of inquiry for cross-examination.' 12
Moreover, the court noted that evidence of prior sexual activity may
be particularly relevant when such evidence explains the physical in-
juries of the complainant" 13 or the source of semen." 14 The holding
and dicta of La Clair provides a substantial basis for the emascula-
tion of the scope of protection afforded the complainant under the
New Hampshire rape shield statute and is a substantial step in the
unmeritedjudical decimation -of a facially restrictive rape shield stat-
ute, contrary to the legislative purpose." t5
In 1982, judicial activism further eroded the intent of the New
Hampshire Legislature. 16 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire,
in State v. Miskell, held that the protection of the New Hampshire
rape shield statute extended to questions asked of a rape complain-
ant during a deposition." 17 The court declared that the New Hamp-
shire Legislature intended to create a testimonial privilege to
protect a rape complainant from "being subjected to unnecessary
embarrassment, prejudice and certain procedures that only serve to
I I1 Id. at 746, 433 A.2d at 1329. The court specifically noted that the evidence might
be relevant to the explanation of the presence of semen in the complainant's vagina.
This is analagous to the "source of semen" exception expressly contained in many rape
shield statutes. See infra Table V, app.
112 Id. at 746, 433 A.2d at 1329. See also United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 272
(8th Cir. 1978).
113 121 N.H. at 746, 433 A.2d at 1329. Seealso State v. Murphy, 134 Vt. 106, 111-12,
353 A.2d 346, 350 (1976).
"14 121 N.H. at 746-47, 433 A.2d at 1329.
115 See infra Table V, app. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire's application of the
New Hampshire rape shield law in La Clair is virtually identical in application to the
language of CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54.86f (West 1985).
116 State v. Miskell, 122 N.H. 842, 451 A.2d 383 (1982).
117 Id. at 844, 451 A.2d at 384. The procedural posture is relevant to a full under-
standing of AMiskell. The defendant's counsel, during a deposition, asked the complain-
ant a series of questions concerning: her sexual relations with her former husbands,
both during and allegedly after their marriages; any extramarital sexual relations that
the complainant might have had; and any current sexual relations that the complainant
might be having. Upon advice of the assistant county attorney, the complainant refused
to answer any questions regarding her prior sexual activity. The defendant then filed a
motion to compel answers to the depositions. After a hearing, the judge granted the
motion reserving the question of the admissibility of any of the compelled evidence.
The county attorney's office followed with a motion for an interlocutory appeal. Id.
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exacerbate the trauma of the rape itself." 118 In extending the ra-
tionale of Howard and La Clair to depositions, the court again cau-
tioned that in "specific circumstances ... due process require[s] that
the evidence be admitted because its probative value outweigh[s] its
possible prejudicial effect." 19 The court fashioned a rule similar to
that enunciated in Howard, stating that, for questions that a defend-
ant asks a rape complainant in a deposition, "[t]he defendant must
show, in a hearing before the trial judge, that there is a reasonable
possibility that the information sought will produce the type of evi-
dence that due process will require to be admitted at trial."' 120
At first glance, Miskell appears merely to extend the protection
of the New Hampshire rape shield law to pre-trial discovery. In re-
ality, the decision further erodes the intended application of the
New Hampshire rape shield statute. Miskell aims to prevent the de-
fendant from asking traumatic questions during discovery. The ex-
tension of the Howard hearing procedure to depositions replicates
existing evidentiary techniques. Adequate protection is already in
place as the complainant's attorney could advise the complainant
not to answer any questions regarding her prior sexual conduct at
deposition. A defendant, wishing to compel an answer, could follow
routine discovery procedures requesting an in camera evidentiary
ruling. Furthermore, any evidence revealed in a depostion would
still be subject at trial to the strictures of New Hampshire's rape
shield statute. In connection with the twentieth century conception
of the crime of rape, the Miskell court's defendant-protective posture
is untenable.
This criticism, standing alone, is insufficient to attack the Miskell
rationale. Procedural duplication is inefficient, but not necessarily
unmerited. Other competing concerns exist, however. The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire applies a less stringent "reason-
able possibility" standard to the admissibility of evidence under
New Hampshire's rape shield statute obtained during discovery. 121
Subsequently, in depositions involving contentious questions,
judges will be compelled to evaluate the issue of admissibility of sex-
118 Id. at 845,451 A.2d at 385 (citing State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 57, 426 A.2d 457,
459 (1981)).
119 Id. at 846, 451 A.2d at 385.
120 Id. 451 A.2d at 386. The court noted that mere speculation that favorable infor-
mation might be forthcoming is insufficient. Moreover, when a rape complainant is
compelled to answer a question at a deposition, the question may not automatically be
asked again at trial. The defendant still must, at an in camera hearing, establish that, in
light of the answer given at the deposition, due process requires that the complainant
again must testify about instances of prior sexual activity. Id., 451 A.2d at 386.
121 Id., 451 A.2d at 386.
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ual history evidence under a lesser degree of scrutiny than applied
prior to Miskell. This factor, paradoxically, increases the possibility
that the rape complainant will be subject to "unnecessary embar-
rassment [and] prejudice . . . that only serve[s] to exacerbate the
trauma of ... rape."' 22 The Miskell opinion, therefore, appears in
direct contention with the court's stated interpretation of the legis-
lative intent behind New Hampshire's rape shield statute.' 23
More recently, in State v. Walsh, 124 the defendant faced charges
in superior court for the aggravated felonious sexual assualt of his
thirteen-year-old stepdaughter. At the beginning of the trial, the
defendant objected to the participation of the complainant's guard-
ian ad litem at trial. 125 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held
that the New Hampshire rape shield statute created a limited testi-
monial privilege insulating the complainant from being questioned
about certain topics at trial. 126 With respect to minors, the court
noted that "a trial court must take special care in guiding a juvenile
in the assertion of a testimonial privilege. ' 127 The court also con-
cluded that "given the young age of the [complainant], her stake in
obtaining the full protection available to her under the rape shield
statute, and the limited involvement of the guardian ad litem in this
case, we find no error in the guardian ad litem's participation at
trial." ' 28 In reaching this determination, the court in Walsh properly
acknowledged thejudiciary's special responsibility in cases involving
minors.
Despite the appropriate extension of the New Hampshire rape
shield statute to procedural issues, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire again ignored the language of the rape shield statute.' 29
Unlike Howard and La Clair, however, the court gave far less consid-
eration to the defendant's contentions.' 30 Walsh may be distinguish-
able, given the age of the complainant. Yet, it is illogical that the
court should distinguish between the protection of the complainant
122 Id. at 845, 451 A.2d at 385.
123 Id., 451 A.2d at 385. See also supra note 118 and accompanying text. The Miskell
court recites the legislative intent behind the New Hampshire rape shield law, but ig-
nores the history in its analysis.
124 126 N.H. 610, 611, 495 A.2d 1256 (1985).
125 Id., at 611, 495 A.2d at 1257. Specifically, the defendant objected to the trial
court's permitting the presence of the guardian ad litem at the prosecution's table for
the purpose of protecting the victim's rights. Id., 495 A.2d at 1257.
126 Id. at 612, 495 A.2d at 1257.
127 Id., 495 A.2d at 1257.
128 Id. at 612, 495 A.2d at 1257-58.
129 The court disregarded the exclusionary language of the New Hampshire rape
shield statute and applied the "balancing" test. Id., 495 A.2d at 1257-58.
130 Id., 495 A.2d at 1257-58.
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based on age. In fact, given the probability that a complainant of
majority age has engaged in more sexual activity than a complainant
of tender years, the avowed purpose of "protect[ing] the victims of
rape from being subjected to unnecessary embarrassment, preju-
dice, and courtroom procedures that only serve to exacerbate the
trauma of the rape itself" is at least equally satisfied by applying the
rape shield statute uniformly to more aged complainants.13 1
The most recent decision of the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire reaffirmed that a defendant in a rape trial is entitled, under the
rape shield statute, to an in camera hearing to determine the admis-
sibility of sexual history evidence.132 In State v. Baker, the court con-
sidered the conviction of a defendant for the felonious sexual
assault of a thirteen-year-old male. 133 Counsel for the defendant
sought to prove that the complainant had engaged in sexual activity
with persons other than the defendant.' 34 During cross-examina-
tion, defense counsel asked the complainant whether he had en-
gaged in any "experiences" with a named third person.' 35 Defense
counsel explained that the object of his questioning was "to show
[the complainant's] experience with regard to these matters and his
ability . . . to fabricate a story . -136 At a bench conference, de-
fense counsel responded that under Howard, the New Hampshire
rape shield statute bars the admission of evidence of prior sexual
activity between the complainant and a third person only if the de-
fendant is "given an opportunity to demonstrate that due process
requires the admission of such evidence because the probative value
in the context of that particular case outweighs the prejudicial effect
on the complainant."' 137 Later in the conversation, defense counsel
requested a hearing to determine the admissibility of such evi-
dence. 138 The State objected to the motion on the grounds of time-
131 State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 57, 426 A.2d 457, 459 (1981). Even though the
trauma to younger rape complainants who have had minimal exposure to sex is great,
rape shield laws are not necessarily designed to offer younger complainants a greater
degree of protection. Older rape complainants, with more numerous sexual exper-
iences, are far more susceptible to degrading cross-examinations than are younger com-
plainants. Defense counsel are likely to give a lesser degree of deference to older
complainants in attacking their credibility and veracity of testimony. Rape shield laws,
therefore, should have equivalent application to complainants, regardless of age.
132 State v. Baker, 127 N.H. 801, 508 A.2d 1059 (1986).
133 Id. at 802, 508 A.2d at 1060-61.
134 Id. 508 A.2d at 1061.
135 Id., 508 A.2d at 1061. The court subsequently sustained an objection by the state
that the question was "confusing or not clear."
136 Id. at 803, 508 A.2d at 1061.
137 Id., 508 A.2d at 1061. citing State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 58-59, 426 A.2d 457,
460-61 (1981)).
138 Id. at 803, 508 A.2d at 1061.
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liness.'t 9 The superior court sustained this objection and excluded
the evidence, refusing to grant a hearing at this particular stage of
the proceeding.' 40
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the ruling was
reversible error and that the defendant was entitled to a hearing on
the admissibility of the evidence.' 4 1 Acknowledging the exaspera-
tion of the trial judge at the untimely motion, the court, neverthe-
less, noted that the timing of the defense counsel's motion had no
impact on the right to a hearing. 142 The court, in granting the hear-
ing, explained that a "Howard hearing is a due process requirement,
which must be given a higher priority than efficiency in the use of
jurors' and witness' time."' 43
The court, reaffirming that the New Hampshire rape shield stat-
ute is "a testimonial privilege to protect the [complainant's] pri-
vacy,"' 144 then formulated an ingenious construction of the Miskell
holding, stating that "an offer of proof may be demanded before the
shield law's privacy privilege must yield to pretrial questioning."'' 45
On the other hand, the Baker court entertained that "Miskell did not
hold, however, that the defendant must make such an offer of proof
before he is entitled even to insist that a Howard hearing be sched-
uled."' 46 Balancing these findings, a defendant who subsequently
fails to make an offer of proof renders the Howard hearing process
effectively moot. Clearly, this method is unlikely to "force an ac-
commodation of sound judicial management with constitutionally
mandated procedure .... 47
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire treads on soft equal
protection footing through its casual gender-based distinctions.
Baker involved a male complainant who was a minor.148 It is not
evident why the male complainant in Baker is afforded a lesser de-
gree of protection than is the minor female complainant in Walsh.14 9
It is apparent from the lack of analysis that the court in Walsh and
139 Id., 508 A.2d at 1061. The State argued that the motion was untimely because the
jury was seated and a witness was on the stand.
140 Id., 508 A.2d at 1061.
141 Id., 508 A.2d at 1061.
142 Id. at 804, 508 A.2d at 1061. The court stated that the state did not cite any rule of
the superior court requiring more timely practice. Id., 508 A.2d at 1061.
143 Id. at 804, 508 A.2d at 1062.
144 Id., 508 A.2d at 1061.
145 Id., 508 A.2d at 1061.
146 Id., 508 A.2d at 1061.
147 Id., 508 A.2d at 1061.
148 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
149 See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text
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Baker failed to consider the equal protection implications of their
gender-based differentiations.
Howard, La Clair, Walsh, and Baker exemplify the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire's futile attempt to reconcile the tenets of the ju-
dicial process with the dictates of the New Hampshire Legislature.
The court's cursory attention to the development of the New Hamp-
shire rape shield statute, intertwined with the court's lack of atten-
tion to the overall societal trend recognizing the equality of women,
contributed greatly to the morass ofjudicial confusion. The court's
directive in Howard for in camera hearings, while professing to aid
the statute in compliance with due process requirements, neglects
relevant constitutional concerns. The in camera hearing stands only
as a monument to the creativity of the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire in imposing its views over a constitutionally-sound legis-
lative mandate. The New Hampshire series of cases provides a stir-
ring example of the concerns that state judiciaries confront when
interpreting facially clear rape shield laws. New Hampshire, how-
ever, is not alone in its dilemma. Other states, as demonstrated be-
low, entertain similar problems in the interpretation of drastically
different statutes through the application of entirely different
principles.
B. TEXAS
At the other extreme from the New Hampshire statute are rape
shield laws which are far more lenient in admission of evidence of
the prior sexual history of the complainant. 150 Prior to September
1, 1986, Texas' rape shield statute explicitly stated that evidence of
specific instances, opinion evidence, and reputation evidence of the
complainant's past sexual conduct is admissible if, at an in camera
hearing, the judge finds the evidence material to a fact at issue in the
case and that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its in-
flammatory or prejudicial nature.' 51 This language, contrasted with
150 See infra Table I, app.
151 See, e.g., TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 22.065 (Vernon Supp. 1986), which provided:
(a) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evi-
dence of the victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual
conduct may be admitted under Sections 22.011 and 22.021 of this code only if, and
only to the extent that, the judge finds that the evidence is material to a fact at issue
in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its
probative value.
(b) If the defendant proposes to ask any question concerning specific in-
stances, opinion evidence, or reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct,
either by direct examination or cross-examination of any witness, the defendant
must inform the court out of the hearing of the jury prior to asking any such ques-
tion. After this notice, the court shall conduct an in camera hearing, recorded by
the court reporter, to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under
668 [Vol. 78
RAPE SHIELD PARADOX
the plainly restrictive text of the New Hampshire rape shield statute,
offered a conciliatory tone which promoted judicial discretion. Un-
like the New Hampshire rape shield statute, the Texas law explicity
provided for an in camera process enunciating standards to deter-
mine admissibility. Thus, the Texas rape shield statute seemingly
Subsection (a) of this section. The court shall determine what evidence is admissi-
ble and shall accordingly limit the questioning. The defendant shall not go outside
these limits nor refer to any evidence ruled inadmissible in camera without prior
approval of the court without the presence of the jury.
(c) The court shall seal the record of the in camera hearing required in Sub-
section (b) of this section for delivery to the appellate court in the event of an ap-
peal.
(d) This section does not limit the right of the state or the accused to impeach
credibility by showing prior felony convictions nor the right of the accused to pro-
duce evidence of promiscuous sexual conduct of a child 14 years or older as a de-
fense to sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, or indecency with a child. If
evidence of a previous felony conviction involving sexual conduct or evidence of
promiscuous sexual conduct is admitted, the court shall instruct the jury as to the
purpose of the evidence and as to its limited use.
The Texas Legislature repealed TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.065, effective September 1,
1986. In its place, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals promulgated TEx. R. GRIM.
EVID. 412, which provides:
(a) In a prosecution for sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault, or attempt
to commit sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault, reputation or opinion evi-
dence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such crime is not admissi-
ble.
(b) In a prosecution for sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault, or at-
tempt to commit assault or aggravated sexual assault evidence of specific instances
of an alleged victim's past sexual behavior is also not admissible, unless:
(1) such evidence is admitted in accordance with paragraphs (c) and (d) of this
rule;
(2) it is evidence (A) that is necessary to make or explain scientific or medical evi-
dence offered by the state; (B) of past sexual behavor with the accused and is of-
fered by the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the
sexual behavior which is the basis of the offense charged; (C) that relates to the
motive or bias of the alleged victim; (D) is admissible under Rule 609; or (E) that is
constitutionally required to be admitted; and
(3) its probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.
(c) If the defendant proposes to introduce any documentary evidence or to
ask any question, either by direct examination or cross-examination of any witness,
concerning specific instances of the alleged victim's past sexual behavior, the de-
fendant must inform the court out of the hearing of the jury prior to introducing
any such evidence or asking any such question. After this notice, the court shall
conduct an in camera hearing, recorded by the court reporter, to determine
whether the proposed evidence is admissible under paragraph (b) of the rule. The
court shall determine what evidence is admissible and shall accordingly limit the
questioning. The defendant shall not go outside these limits nor refer to any evi-
dence ruled inadmissible in camera without prior approval of the court without the
presence of the jury.
(d) The court shall seal the record of the in camera hearing required in para-
graph (c) of this rule for delivery to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(e) This rule does not limit the right of the accused to produce evidence ofpromiscuous sexual conduct of a child 14 years old or older as a defense to sexual
assault, aggravated sexual assault, indecency with a child or an attempt to commit
any of the foregoing crimes. If such evidence is admitted, the court shall instruct
the jury as to the purpose of the evidence and as to its limited use.
The complete exclusion of reputation and opinion evidence under Rule 412, however,
does not alter the analysis of opinions which interpret former § 22.065.
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resolved the dilemma that the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
confronted in determining the appropriate level ofjudicial review to
comply with due process and sixth amendment concerns. Yet, de-
spite the tone and detail of the Texas rape shield statute, Texas
courts were still required to balance the merits of admission and
exclusion in the same fashion as are the courts of New Hampshire.
When forced into this role, Texas courts applied extraneous inter-
pretations innundated with confusing references to legislative his-
tory in order to substantiate their opinions.
Texas' initial recognition of the inherent tension between the
rights of the complainant and the defendant surfaced in 1984 in Ex
parte Rose. 152 Exparte Rose arose from a criminal indictment charging
the defendant with the aggravated rape of his fifteen-year-old
daughter. 153 Prior to voir dire, the Criminal District Court of Dallas
County instructed defense counsel, Robert Rose, that, under the
Texas rape shield statute, "no questions are to be asked of the vic-
tim, alleged victim, and no evidence is to be offered in any way, go-
ing into prior sexual activity of the victim .... ,,-54 Upon cross-
examination of the complainant, Rose inquired, "I take it nothing
like that [rape] ever happened to you before?" 155 The prosecution
objected to the question on the ground that it implicated the prior
sexual activity of the complainant.' 56 The court, pointing out the
admonition issued prior to voir dire, cited Rose for contempt of
court. 1
57
Following a hung jury and the declaration of a mistrial in the
principal case, Rose filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus
in the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. 158 Rose contended that
the admonition of the trial court prior to voir dire referred to ques-
tions implicating "sexual conduct" as proof of the promiscuity of
the complainant, not as to whether the complainant had been the
victim of a previous rape. 59 The court rejected this limited defini-
tion of the term "sexual conduct," holding that in the context of the
Texas rape shield statute, the term "encompasses sexual activity or
152 704 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)(en banc) (reh'g denied February 26, 1986).
153 Id. at 752.
154 Id. at 753.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 754. Rose received a five hundred dollar fine as punishment. Id.
158 Id. Rose argued that there was no evidence to support the respondent judge's
conclusion that the question propounded to the complainant violated the constricts of
the Texas rape shield statute. Id.
159 Id. at 755.
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conduct whether willingly engaged in or not."1 60 The court subse-
quently denied Rose's application for relief.161
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' liberal interpretation of
the former Texas rape shield statute comported well with the mod-
em complainant-protective perception of rape shield laws. 162 On
rehearing, Judge Clinton's concurrence in the denial of Rose's ap-
plication attempted to glean the legislative intent behind the enact-
ment of Texas' rape shield statute.' 63 The analysis noted that
"22.065 is derived from former 21.13 and it, in turn, from the 'Wed-
dington package.' "164 With respect to the thrust of the original bill,
the concurrence noted the advancement of two propositions:
The authors of the bill felt that, except where such conduct pertains to
the issue of consent, the victim's past sexual activity is irrelevant to the
question of whether or not a crime was committed. Even where con-
sent is an issue, only particular acts, not the woman's entire sexual
history would be relevant to consent to intercourse with a particular
individual. 16 5
Moreover, the legislative history indicates that the Texas rape shield
statute was "strongly worded in favor of excluding most of the vic-
tims' sexual activity-even more so than our original proposal."' 166
In dissent, Judge Teague asserted that Rose was not guilty of
contempt of court.' 67 Reasoning that Rose was not ordered to re-
frain from asking any specific question, Judge Teague argued that
"[t]he pretrial order in this cause is a punitive order and must be
considered in that light. There also must be no doubt from the rec-
ord that Rose intentionally and wilfully violated it before he can be
160 Id. The court opted for the normal meaning and common usage of the term "sex-
ual conduct." H. BLACK, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 367 (4th Ed. 1968) defines
"conduct" as "personal behavior; deportment; mode of action; any positive or negative
act." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (unabr. ed.
1967), defines "sexual" as "of or pertaining to sex; sexual matters." 704 S.W.2d at 755.
161 704 S.W.2d at 757.
162 See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
163 704 S.W.2d. at 757 (Clinton, J., concurring).
164 Id. at 758 (Clinton,J., concurring). § 21.13 was the forerunner to § 22.065. Wed-
dington, who was a member of the Texas Legislature, co-sponsored the Texas rape
shield law. Id.
165 704 S.W.2d at 758 (Clinton, J., concurring) (citing Weddington, Rape Law in Tevas:
H.B. 284, And the Road to Reform, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 11 (1975-76)). Weddington pro-
vides a rationale for the Texas rape shield law, stating:
The accused enjoys many protections during the course of his prosecution, includ-
ing the inadmissibility of his own past sexual behavior-even if other women have
previously accused him of rape or rape attempts. In voting to add [the Texas rape
shield law] .... a majority of House members asserted that irrelevant testimony
about the victim's past at trial did not meaningfully protect the defendant.
Id. at 758-59 n.4.
166 Id. at 759 (Clinton, J., concurring).
167 Id. at 761 (Teague, J., dissenting).
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found guilty of contempt."' 68 The dissent also noted that the word
"that," as used in the question "I take it nothing like that ever hap-
pened to you before?," did not necessarily refer to the prior sexual
activity of the complainant. 169
Facially, the dissent appears as nothing more than an illogical
attempt to support a proffered result. Criticism is easily levelled at
the constructionist nature of the argument. 170 This linguistic dis-
pute, nevertheless, laid the framework for the interpretation of the
legitimate scope of the former Texas rape shield statute. Subse-
quent opinions confirm that this battle remains unresolved in the
context of the recent adoption in Texas of a new rule of evidence.
The case of Allen v. State provided the first extensive explanation
of the prior Texas rape shield statute after Ex parte Rose. 17 1 In Allen,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant's con-
viction for the aggravated rape of a seventeen-year-old female. 172
The defendant had contended that the trial court erred in excluding
evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity, particularly that
the complainant was not a virgin. 173 In its analysis, the court traced
the development of the Texas rape shield statute, 74 emphasizing
that:
[t]he rationale behind these statutes is that evidence of a rape victim's
prior sexual activity is of dubious probative value and relevance and is
highly embarrassing and prejudicial. Often such evidence has been
used to harass the prosecuting victim. Sponsors of these statutes as-
sert that they encourage victims of sexual assault to report the crimes
without fear of having their past sexual history exposed to the
public.175
Using this standard of admissibility, the court posited that, under
the Texas rape shield statute, the evidence be material to an issue in
the case and that the inflammatory or prejudicial nature of the evi-
168 Id. at 763 (TeagueJ., dissenting) (advocating a more restrained application of the
protective scope of the Texas rape shield law).
169 Id.
170 See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
171 700 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
172 Id. at 932.
173 Id. at 926. The defendant specifically alleged three grounds for error. Each
ground stated that the trial court erred in not allowing testimony of the complainant's
prior sexual activity: (1) to refute the misleading testimony elicited by the state; (2) that
was material to the defensive theory of consent, and (3) after the complainant left a false
impression with the jury. Id.
174 Id. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.13 was in effect at the time of the defendant's trial.
It has since been replaced by TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.065 and, subsequently, TEX.
R. CRIM. EvID. 412, with little substantive alteration.
175 700 S.W.2d at 929 (citing Bell v. Harrison, 670 F.2d 656, 658 (6th Cir. 1982)).
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dence not outweigh its probative value. 176
The court also determined that the issue of the complainant's
virginity was not material to an issue in the case. 177 Reiterating the
second prong of its criteria for admissibility, the court emphatically
noted that "rape shield statutes should not be used to exclude
highly relevant evidence and violate the defendant's right of con-
frontation or other constitutional rights."'' 7 8 The language in Allen
suggests that:
[i]n order to assess the rape shield laws one must ask whether these
state interests [responsibility of the judiciary to protect the complain-
ant from questions not within the proper bounds of cross-examina-
tion], as embodied in particular statutory standards applied in specific
factual contexts, outweigh the defendant's valued [sixth amendment]
right to meet the prosecution's case that he is indeed innocent. Where
the balance inclines toward the accused, any provision including this
evidence cannot be squared with the Constitution. 179
Applying this balancing approach, the court held that the trial judge
correctly applied the Texas rape shield statute in excluding the ad-
mission of evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct.'8 0
Consistent with his concurrence in Ex parte Rose, Judge Clinton
offered a vehement dissent in Allen.' 81 Judge Clinton evinced the
primary concern that "the majority opinion is laying down a propo-
sition for admitting testimony of prior sexual activity even broader
than any extant before enactment of [the Texas rape shield stat-
ute]."' 1 2 In addition to emphasizing the "slippery-slope" of an ad
hoc balancing approach, the dissent criticized the majority holding
that evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct may be ad-
missible to attack the complainant's credibility, noting that proper
skepticism existed in the legal community that "sexual activity can
be equated with moral character and thus testimonial reliability."'' 83
Judge Clinton's dissent offers a cogent, modem analysis of the ma-
jority's seemingly protective opinion which, in reality, pierces the
avowed purpose of rape shield laws.
Allen produces a most paradoxical result. While excluding evi-
176 Id. This interpretation is consistent with the relevancy and "balancing" tests con-
tained in FED. R. EvID. 104 and FED. R. EvID. 403.
177 Id. at 930.
178 Id. at 932 (citing Bell v. Harrison, 670 F.2d 656, 658 (6th Cir. 1982)).
179 Id. (citing Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 54-55 (1977)).
180 Id.
181 Id. at 937 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 938 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 940 (Clinton, J., dissenting) (citing Comment, Rape-Admissibility of Victim's Prior
Sexual Conduct: What is the Law in Texas?, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 317, 320 (1979)).
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dence of the past sexual history of the complainant in the instant
case, the majority opinion severely contracts the prospective scope
of the Texas rape shield statute. Recognizing this anomaly, the dis-
sent foregoes the poorly elucidated "balancing" test in order to cre-
ate, ex ante, a more complainant-protective rape shield law. 184
Judge Clinton, as in his concurrence in Ex parte Rose, 185 strives to
effectuate the societal concerns underlying the Texas rape shield
statute. Allen further illustrates the confusion state courts face when
engaging in the dialectic of interpreting the limits of rape shield
laws. Though the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals placed greater
reliance on the legislative history and commentary surrounding the
Texas rape shield statute than have other courts, the varying inter-
pretations inevitably lead to an obfuscating series of judicial
opinions.
Two more recent opinions by the Court of Appeals of Texas
provide minimal insight as to the proper interpretation of the prior
Texas rape shield statute. In Sapien v. State, the defendant was con-
victed of the aggravated rape of his daughter. 186 On appeal, the
defendant alleged error in the trial court's exclusion of evidence of
the complainant's sexual conduct with other children. 187 Without
explicit analysis, the Court of Appeals of Texas stated that the Texas
rape shield statute prohibited the defendant from using the evi-
dence to show the complainant's promiscuity or to impeach her gen-
erally and that the prejudicial effect of such evidence outweighed its
probative value. 188 In excluding the evidence in question, the court
allowed the complainant the testimonial protection that both the
former and current Texas rape shield laws provide for children
under the age of fourteen. 189
At first glance, the Sapien court's relaxed application of the "bal-
ancing" test signaled an evolving judicial posture aimed at giving
greater deference to the mandates of the Texas Legislature. In real-
184 See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
185 700 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)(Clinton, J., concurring).
186 705 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). The parties stipulated that the defend-
ant's daughter was a child under the age of fourteen.
187 Id. at 216. In particular, the defendant alleged that the evidence was relevant and
admissible because the state contended that the complainant's credibility was supported
by her sexual knowledge. The defendant contended that the excluded evidence would
have shown that the complainant's sexual knowledge could have been gained from
sources other than the defendant. Id.
188 Id.
189 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. TEx. PENAL CODE § 22.065(d) (Vernon
Supp. 1986) excluded the use of evidence of the prior sexual conduct of a child under
the age of fourteen to establish promiscuity for impeachment purposes. This exclusion
is retained in the text of TEx. R. CRIM. Evio. 412.
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ity, the opinion exposed the tribulations courts have experienced
when interpreting the Texas rape shield statute. The court genu-
flects to procedural irregularities for support of its decision in lieu
of offering substantive policy statements. 1 90 The impact of Sapien, in
light of these distinctions, remains dubious.
The Court of Appeals of Texas continued this uncertain ap-
proach in Lewis v. State.'9' In Lewis, the defendant was convicted of
the sexual assault of his fifteen-year-old daughter. 192 The defendant
attempted to elicit testimony that the complainant had previously
engaged in sexual activity with others.19 3 The Court of Appeals up-
held the trial court's refusal to admit such tesimony, enunciating a
more complainant-protective standard that evidence of sexual con-
duct is inadmissible unless it tends to resolve an issue in the case. 194
Given the decision in Lewis, Texas courts have moved toward
adopting a modem analysis of the purpose of rape shield laws by
emphasizing the protection of the privacy of the complainant. 195
Texas' recent promulgation of Rule 412, excluding completely rep-
utation and opinion evidence, emphasizes this factor. 196 This hy-
pothesis, however, ignores the fact that Texas courts have yet to
formulate the factors to be considered when balancing the probative
value of evidence of past conduct against its prejudicial nature.
Though composing a list of this type is difficult, state courts require
some type of decision-making guidance. Moreover, neither Lewis
nor Sapien, which were both Court of Appeals of Texas decisions,
contains language effectively rebuffing the analyses offered by the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in Ex parte Rose and Allen. The
continued lack of a credible analytical framework for addressing the
scope and purpose of Texas' former rape shield statute applies to
Texas' new rule of evidence and casts doubt on the contention that
the lower Texas courts have abandoned their super-legislative anal-
yses in favor of a more protective reading which comports with the
modem position adopted by the Texas Legislature. In the face of
these continuing questions, the Texas analysis of rape shield laws
remains unclear and portends for more judicial confusion until the
Supreme Court of Texas addresses the issue.
190 705 S.W.2d at 217.
191 709 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
192 Id. at 735.
193 Id.
194 Id. The Court explicitly stated that unchastity is a defense only when consent is at
issue.
195 See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
196 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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VIII. THE CORRECTIVE NATURE OF THE JUDICIARY
A. MISSOURI
In comparison with the most recent Texas rape shield statute,
Missouri's rape shield law more specifically enumerates situations in
which sexual history evidence is admissible. 197 Despite this attempt
to summarize the situations calling for admissibility, the Missouri
rape shield statute remains textually ambiguous. Section 1 offers a
complete prohibition on opinion, reputation, and prior sexual con-
duct evidence, which is qualified by section 2.198 The Missouri Gen-
eral Assembly's inability to draft an unambiguous provision has
contributed heavily to the confusion Missouri courts have recently
exhibited in defining the scope Missouri's rape shield statute.
In State v. Brown, the Supreme Court of Missouri first examined
the constitutionality of Missouri's rape shield statute.' 99 The court
noted that "prior to the enactment of the [rape shield law], evidence
of a complainant's general reputaton for morality and chastity was
held admissible as bearing on the issue of consent but not specific
acts of alleged misconduct.- 20 0 Recognizing the normative incon-
sistency of this proposition, the court rejected the idea that a wo-
man's prior consent is relevant to the question of later consent as a
"tired, insensitive and archaic platitude of yesteryear."-20 '
Despite this progressive judicial pronouncement, the thrust of
the court's analysis in Brown proceeded along more traditional
197 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (Vernon Supp. 1987) provides, in pertinent part:
1. In prosecutions under chapter 566, RSMo, or prosecutions related to sexual
conduct under chapter 568, RSMo, opinion and reputation evidence of the com-
plaining witness' prior sexual conduct is inadmissible; evidence of specific instances
of the complaining witness' prior sexual conduct or the absence of such instances or
conduct is inadmissible, except where such specific instances are:
(1) Evidence of the sexual conduct of the complaining witness with the defedant to
prove consent where consent is a defense to the alleged crime and the evidence is
reasonably contemporaneous with the date of the alleged crime; or
(2) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing an alternative source
or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease;
(3) Evidence of immediate surrounding circumstances of the alleged crime; or
(4) Evidence relating to the previous chastity of the complaining witness in cases,
where, by statute, previously chaste character is required to be proved by the
prosecution.
2. Evidence of the sexual conduct of the complaining witness offered under this
section is admissible to the extent that the court finds the evidence relevant to a
material fact or issue.
198 Id.
199 636 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1982)(en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1212.
200 Id. at 933. Earlier courts reasoned, consistent with the position of Dean Wigmore,
see supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text, that a woman of previous unchaste charac-
ter was more likely to commit an act of sexual intercourse than a woman who was strictly
virtuous. Id.
201 Id. at 933 (citing Milenkovic v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 272 N.W.2d 320 (1978)).
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lines.20 2 In focusing initially on the enactment of the statute, the
court commented that the Missouri legislature acknowledged the
fallacious nature of Wigmore's view when it limited the admissibility
of evidence of a rape complainant's prior sexual conduct to the
specfic exceptions enumerated in sections 1 and 2.203 This recogni-
tion comports well with a complainant-protective analysis of the
purpose of Missouri's rape shield statute.
The court, however, abruptly shifted gears, declaring that the
statute created only a "presumption" that evidence of a complain-
ant's past sexual conduct is irrelevant.20 4 Furthermore, the court
interpreted the generalized exception of section 2 to allow introduc-
tion of any evidence that "the court finds ... relevant to a material
fact or issue. '20 5 This interpretation effectively emasculated the
opinion and reputation evidence exclusion included in section 1.206
The court cited the procedural method for evaluating evidence
outside of the presence of thejury as protective of the Missouri rape
shield statute's constitutionality.20 7 Subsequently, the court, in
camera, determined that evidence of the complainant's specific sex-
ual activity was properly excluded.208
State v. Brown is a paradigm of the Missouri Supreme Court's
legitimate effort to effectuate the legislative intent behind Missouri's
rape shield statute. The court, however, falls victim to the ambigu-
ous language of the statute and engages in an ill-fated attempt to
balance the competing interests of the complainant and the defend-
ant. In classifying the legislature's dictate as a "presumption," the
Brown court undermines its progressive attempt to effectively imple-
ment the Missouri rape shield law. This shift in philosophy, attribu-
table to the confusing text of the Missouri statute, created a
challenge for future Missouri courts.
202 Id. at 933. See also supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
203 Id. at 933. The court explained the legislative intent behind the statute in three
concise statements. First, the statute redressed the faulty premise upon which evidence
of prior sexual conduct had traditionally been admitted. Second, the legislature recog-
nized that, in most instances, a rape complainant's past conduct has no reasonable bear-
ing upon the issue of consent or credibility. Finally, the legislature attempted to aid
effective law enforcement by encouraging victims of rape to report and prosecute such




206 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
207 636 S.W.2d at 934. The court advocated the application of a test balancing the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect at an in camera hearing to
determine admissibility. Id. This accords with Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (3) (Vernon
Supp. 1987).
208 Id. at 935.
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The full impact of this discontinuity reached fruition in State v.
Jones.20 9 In Jones, the defendant was convicted of rape and sodomy
in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. 210 At an in camera
hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's proposal to offer evi-
dence on the issue of consent.211 On appeal, the defendant argued
for the admissibility of the evidence under the generalized excep-
tion of section 2 of the Missouri rape shield statute.21 2 The
Supreme Court of Missouri, clarifying part of the confusion inher-
ent in its Brown opinion, held that the general exception of section 2
is directed only at the exceptions set forth in section 1, and, then,
only to the extent that the evidence is related to a material fact or
issue. 213 By effectively overruling Brown to the extent that it di-
verges from this proposition, 214 the Supreme Court of Missouri
edged back toward the complainant-protective dicta contained in
the initial portion of Brown.215
In dissent, Judge Blackmar argued for adherence to Brown.216
The dissent recognized that "the primary purpose of [the Missouri
rape shield] statute was to repudiate the evidentiary proposition that
a woman who had engaged in prior extramarital intercourse was
more likely to consent to sexual activity than a woman of prior
chaste' character." 217 Furthermore, Judge Blackmar concluded,
without elaboration, that the complainant's sexual history is irrele-
vant except in unusual cases. 218
Despite his seemingly dispositive discussion, Judge Blackmar
postulated that Brown more adequately addressed the confrontation
and due process concerns surrounding a statute that deprives a
criminal defendant of the opportunity to introduce evidence which
is relevant and material in his defense. 219 In support of this posi-
tion, Judge Blackmar formulated situations in which evidence of the
complainant's prior sexual history should be admitted but would
209 716 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. 1986)(en banc).
210 Id. at 800.
211 Id. The defendant stated that he had had consensual intercourse with the com-
plainant three and one-half to four and one-half months previous to the instant incident.
Id.
212 Id. In support of this contention, the defendant relied on the language of Slate v.
Brown that "the statute creates only a presumption that evidence of a victim's prior sex-
ual conduct is irrelevant." Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
216 716 S.W.2d at 802 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
217 Id. (BlackmarJ., dissenting).
218 Id. (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
219 Id. (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
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not fall within any of the statutory exceptions. 220 Applying this
logic, Judge Blackmar concluded that the repudiation of Brown in-
vited constitutional problems. 22 1
The dissenting analysis in Jones is without merit. First, a consti-
tutional construction of the Missouri rape shield statute is still possi-
ble given the vitality of the "balancing" test engaged in under the
statutory exception. 222 Secondly, the majority in Jones merely repu-
diates the "presumption" language of Brown. 223 Finally, Judge
Blackmar's acceptance of the rationale underlying the enactment of
Missouri's rape shield statute undermines any need to revert to the
protective Brown posture.224 The thrust of his analysis relies on
ideas popularized in the outdated Victorian era. Judge Blackmar's
opposition to Jones appears as an abortive attempt to apply an
archaic remnant of the law of evidence. 225
The Supreme Court of Missouri's opinion in State v. Jones stands
as a cogent analysis of the modem function of rape shield laws. De-
spite ambiguous language and a powerful statement in Brown, the
court admirably attempted to elevate the status of the rape shield
law to the level envisioned by the Missouri General Assembly. The
result is an effective judicial parsing of an oblique statute through a
well-reasoned analysis. Though proponents of the minority view re-
main, the Jones opinion portends an effective summary of the proper
function of rape shield laws.
B. PENNSYLVANIA
In 1973, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a rape
shield statute similar in structure to the law adopted in Missouri. 226
220 Id. at 802-03 (Blackmar, J., dissenting). Specifically, Judge Blackmar suggested a
scenario in which the defendant claimed that the complainant was a prostitute who,
when there was an argument about consideration, alleged rape only after services had
been furnished. The dissent argued that in such a situation, contrary to the Missouri
rape shield statute, the defendant should be permitted to show that the complainant was
a professional prostitute. The dissent also applied a similar analysis to a situation where
the complainant is a nymphomaniac. Id.
221 Id. at 803 (Blackmar,J., dissenting).
222 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
223 716 S.W.2d at 800.
224 See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
225 716 S.W.2d. at 804 (Blackmar, J., dissenting). Judge Blackmar would admit a
statement of the complainant asking the defendant's sister why the defendant had be-
come involved with his wife. To Judge Blackmar, this inquiry would signify a feeling of
possessiveness or a device for revenge. These improper conclusions distort the modern
purpose of rape shield laws and the rationale underlying the enactment of the Missouri
rape shield statute as discussed supra in notes 9-11 and 217-18 and accompanying text.
Id. (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
226 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (Purdon 1983) provides, in relevant part:
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Pennsylvania courts, however, approach this statute in a manner dis-
parate from that of the Missouri judiciary. Consistent with the Mis-
souri statute, Pennsylvania's rape shield law generally prohibits the
introduction of evidence of the rape complainant's sexual history.227
The language of subsection (a) of Pennsylvania's rape shield statute
appears to explicitly prohibit the admission of opinion and reputa-
tion evidence of the complainant's past sexual conduct. 22 8 The in
camera procedure enunciated in subsection (b), however, casts
doubt upon this absolutist proposition. 229 As a result, the Penn-
sylvania judiciary has interpreted Pennsylvania's rape shield statute
as allowing certain types of evidence at trial that the Pennsylvania
General Assembly intended to exclude. 230
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania first addressed the proper
interpretation of Pennsylvania's rape shield statute in Commonwealth
v. Majorana.23 1 In Majorana, the complainant alleged that she was
raped by one of the codefendants in a car driven by the defend-
ant.23 2 Defense counsel sought to introduce evidence that the com-
plainant had engaged in consensual intercourse with the
codefendant two hours prior to the alleged incident. 233 The Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania, in turn, objected on the ground that the
evidence was inadmissible under Pennsylvania's rape shield stat-
ute.234 The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection to
(a) General rule.-Evidence of specific instances of alleged victim's past sexual
conduct, opinion evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct, and reputa-
tion evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct shall not be admissible in
prosecutions under this chapter except evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual
conduct with the defendant where consent of the alleged victim is at issue and such
evidence is otherwise admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence.
(b) Evidentiary proceedings.-A defendant who proposes to offer evidence of the
alleged victim's past sexual conduct pursuant to subsection (a) shall file written mo-
tion and offer of proof at the time of trial. If. . . the court determines that the
motion and offer of proof are sufficient... the court shall order an in camera hear-
ing and shall make findings on the record.
227 Id. See also infra Table V, app..
228 Id.
229 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
230 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602, 470 A.2d 80 (1983).
231 503 Pa. 602, 470 A.2d 80 (1983).
232 Id. at 605, 470 A.2d at 82.
233 Id. at 605-06, 470 A.2d at 82.
234 Id., 470 A.2d at 82. The procedural posture of the case indicates that the factual
background includes incidents of sexual activity between the complainant and the de-
fendant. This evidence is admissible under many state rape shield laws. The Penn-
sylvania rape shield statute, however, limits the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual
activity between the complainant and one of the codefendants. See supra note 226 and
accompanying text. The court, in its analysis, discusses a broader range of relationships
involving the complainant. It is the scope of the court's commentary which sheds light




any testimony about either the complainant's prior sexual relation-
ship with the codefendant or the events of the day in question.235
Defense counsel excepted to the trial court's ruling, arguing that the
contested testimony was not offered to attack the source of semen in
the complainant's vagina.23 6
On appeal to the superior court, the majority upheld the trial
court's ruling, stating that " '[t]hey are two separate incidents,
whether both, either, or neither in fact occurred .... As testimony
of a prior and separate incident [the defendant's] testimony was
barred by the Rape Shield Law unless the defendants placed con-
sent at issue and filed the 3104(b) motion.' "237 The superior court
also held the evidence inadmissible as an explanation for the source
of semen in the complainant's vagina, reasoning that this evidence
would also be the result of a prior consensual act.23 8 The majority
couched these findings in its belief that " 'the raison detre of rape
shield statutes is partially to correct the manner in which our crimi-
nal justice system has approached the victim of a sexual assault.' "239
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the trial court's
decision, stating that "[e]vidence which directly contradicts the act
or occurrence at issue is not barred by [the rape shield] statute." 240
In its analysis, the court recognized the criminal justice system's his-
torically inappropriate treatment of rape complainants. 241 In repu-
diating this position, the court commented that legislation
throughout the United States limited the admissibility of evidence of
a rape complainant's past sexual activities or her character.242 The
court further exclaimed that "rape shield laws are legislative
recognitions of the minimal probative value of sexual history and
are designed to prohibit ... the travesty of ... defense witnesses
testifying to the sexual propensities . . . of the complaining
witness." 243
In spite of this lucid commentary, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania determined that the Pennsylvania General Assembly did
235 Id. at 606, 470 A.2d at 82.
236 Id., 470 A.2d at 82.
237 Id. at 606-07, 470 A.2d at 82 (quoting Commonwealth v. Majorana, 299 Pa. Super.
211, 216, 445 A.2d 529, 532 (1982)).
238 Id. at 607, 470 A.2d at 82.
239 Id., 470 A.2d at 82 (quoting Commonwealth v. Majorana, 299 Pa. Super. at 216,
445 A.2d at 532).
240 Id. at 608, 470 A.2d at 83.
241 Id. at 608, 470 A.2d at 83. The court noted that as recently as 1940 the admissibil-
ity, on a rape charge, of the complainant's character for chastity or unchastity was gener-
ally conceded. Id., 470 A.2d at 83 (citing I J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 62 (3d ed. 1940)).
242 Id. at 609 n.7, 470 A.2d at 84 n.7.
243 Id. at 608, 470 A.2d at 84.
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not intend the rape shield statute to prohibit rebuttal evidence
which directly negates the act of intercourse with which the defend-
ant is charged. 244 Applying this rationale to Majorana, the court
held that the Pennsylvania rape shield statute did not preclude the
defendant from introducing evidence explaining the source of se-
men in the complainant's vagina. 245
Majorana contains several theoretical and conceptual deficien-
cies. The Majorana court disregards the predicate of the Penn-
sylvania rape shield statute requiring consent of the complainant to
be at issue before evidence about the complainant's past sexual con-
duct with persons other than the defendant can be admitted.
246
Moreover, the first section of the opinion appears to support the
modern conception of the function of rape shield laws. 247 Yet, the
court's analysis turns on the conclusion that the evidence in ques-
tion "directly contradicts the act or occurrence at issue [and] is not
barred by the statute. ' 248 This proposition is grounded in the tradi-
tional formulation of evidentiary rules in rape cases. There is no
indication, however, that the semen found in the complainant's va-
gina, even if attributable to an event prior to the encounter in ques-
tion, contradicts the alleged offense. These analytical shortcomings
are inapposite to the court's reasoning that a goal of the Penn-
sylvania rape shield statute is to exclude "sordid and sometimes fan-
ciful accounts of the complainant. '249  The Majorana court's
interpretation, therefore, contravenes the "plain meaning" that the
Pennsylvania General Assembly ascribed to the rape shield statute.
These conceptual weaknesses were touched upon in dissent by
Judge Larsen. 250 In recognizing the majority's textual disregard,
Judge Larsen explained that "[t]he language of this statute is clear
and unambiguous: the only evidence of a victim's past sexual con-
duct which may be admitted at trial is evidence of past sexual con-
duct with the defendant, where consent of the victim is an issue.
' 25
'
The dissent noted that, with respect to the alleged rape for which
the defendant was being tried, the defendant never attempted to ex-
culpate himself on the grounds that the victim had consented.
252
244 Id., 470 A.2d at 84. The court expounded that probative value should be balanced
against prejudicial effect in determining admissibility. Id., 470 A.2d at 84.
245 Id. at 611, 470 A.2d at 85.
246 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
248 503 Pa. at 610, 470 A.2d at 84.
249 503 Pa. at 609, 470 A.2d at 84.
250 Id. at 612, 470 A.2d at 85 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
251 Id., 470 A.2d at 85 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
252 Id. at 613, 470 A.2d at 86 (Larsen, J., dissenting). Judge Larsen, noting that the
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Judge Larsen recognized that the evidence sought to be introduced
was relevant only to a showing that the semen was the result of an
earlier act of allegedly consensual intercourse.253 In finding that the
majority interpretation decimated the purpose of the Pennsylvania
rape shield statute, Judge Larsen reasoned that the court's opinion
"has ... taken the first step to... allow the evil and harm of intro-
ducing evidence of a woman's past sexual conduct to creep back
into the courtroom." 254
The dissenting opinion ofJudge Larsen pinpoints the paradoxi-
cal result dictated by the majority opinion.2 55 The Majorana court,
while giving cursory approval to the goals promoted by the Penn-
sylvania rape shield statute, interprets the law in such a manner as to
dilute its effectiveness. This analytical inconsistency, whether in-
tended or not, contravenes the intent of the Pennsylvania General
Assembly and provides an insufficient level of protection for rape
complainants.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania continued this inappropri-
ate mode ofjudical review in Commonwealth v. Black.256 In Black, the
trial court, after an in camera hearing, permitted the defendant, who
was the complainant's father, to cross-examine the complainant for
the purpose of revealing the complainant's sexual relationship with
her fifteen-year-old brother.2 57 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed, holding that the evidence of the sibling relationship might
establish that the complainant wanted to punish her father or have
him removed so that her brother could return.258 In Black, consent
of the complainant was not at issue. The reasoning of the court thus
disregards the explicit limitations imposed by the Pennsylvania Gen-
eral Assembly through the enactment of the rape shield statute.2 59
By 1985, therefore, the Pennsylvania judiciary had taken significant
steps toward emasculating the protection afforded to rape com-
plainants by the Pennsylvania rape shield statute.
One year later, however, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
consensual intercourse allegedly occurred hours before the alleged rape, reasoned that
the rape shield statute was therefore inapplicable. Id., 470 A.2d at 86 (Larsen, J.,
dissenting).
253 Id. at 613, 470 A.2d at 85 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
254 Id., 470 A.2d at 85 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
255 See supra notes 240-49 and accompanying text.
256 337 Pa. Super. 548, 487 A.2d 396 (1985).
257 Id. at 551, 487 A.2d at 397-98. The alleged rape was reported three months after
the defendant and the complainant's brother argued violently, resulting in the complain-
ant's brother leaving home. Id. at 552, 487 A.2d at 397-98.
258 Id. at 552, 487 A.2d at 398.
259 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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appeared to recognize this unwarranted expansion ofjudical review.
Commonwealth v. Berry260 involved a defendant convicted of the rape,
indecent assault, and corruption of his fifteen-year-old stepdaugh-
ter. The defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying
his request to cross-examine the complainant concerning her subse-
quent dating relationship with a man in his early twenties. 26' In de-
nying the defendant's proposed cross-examination, the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania found that the instant case did not fall within
the parameters of Black.262
Berry remains a significant departure from the court's percep-
tion in Majorana of the Pennsylvania rape shield statute. The court
in Berry, while excluding the evidence of the complainant's prior dat-
ing relationship, granted approval to the Black court's limitation on
the protection of the rape shield law.263 Furthermore, the applica-
tion of the "balancing" test in Berry establishes that the court con-
sidered the admission of the disputed evidence. 264 This position is
difficult to reconcile with the language of the Pennsylvania rape
shield statute and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Majorana opin-
ion.265 Nevertheless, Berry signals a drawing back by the Penn-
sylvania judiciary upon the recognition that the courts were
engaging in activities outside of their sphere of responsibility.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania exhibited further judicial
restraint in Commonwealth v. Clark.266 The defendant in Clark was
convicted of the rape, attempted rape, indecent assault, and simple
assault of a sixteen-year-old female. 267 The complainant testified
that she did not know what the word "penetration" 268 meant until it
was explained to her by the assistant district attorney.2 69 The de-
260 355 Pa. Super. 243, 513 A.2d 410 (1986).
261 Id. at 254, 513 A.2d at 415. The defendant specifically argued that Commonwealth v.
Black relaxed the constraints of the Pennsylvania rape shield law, permitting cross-exam-
ination of the complainant on issues of sexual conduct, to impeach, or to show bias,
interest, or prejudice. Id., 513 A.2d at 415.
262 Id., 513 A.2d at 415. The court interpreted Black to permit evidence of prior sex-
ual conduct to show a "specific bias" or "hostility" toward the defendant or to show the
alleged complainant's desire for retribution. In noting that the complainant's dating
relationship occurred in 1984, one year following the alleged sexual assaults, the court
determined that the inflammatory nature of the evidence outweighed its probative value.
Id., 513 A.2d at 415.
263 See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
264 Id.
265 See supra notes 226 and 240-43 and accompanying text.
266 355 Pa. Super. 200, 512 A.2d 1282 (1986).
267 Id. at 202-03, 512 A.2d at 1283.
268 "Penetration" is a legal element of the crime of rape. A rape complainant, there-
fore, is required to establish legal "penetration" in order to procure a conviction.
269 Id. at 205, 512 A.2d at 1284.
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fendant, relying on statements made to a doctor that the complain-
ant had previously been pregnant, asserted that the complainant
should have been aware of the meaning of "penetration." 270 Subse-
quently, defense counsel contended that the trial court erred in
prohibiting the cross-examination of the doctor concerning the
statements made by the complainant about her prior pregnancy. 27'
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania concluded that the trial
court properly excluded the proposed evidence regarding the com-
plainant's past sexual conduct.272 The court affirmed the trial
court's ruling that the evidence of prior sexual conduct was not rele-
vant to show motive, bias, or to attack the credibility of the com-
plainant.273 Furthermore, the court determined that the evidence
was not relevant to the issue of penetration because the complainant
had been informed of the distinction between complete vaginal pen-
etration and the lesser requirements for legally sufficient
penetration.274
Clark furthers the erroneous interpretation of the Pennsylvania
rape shield statute by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Majorana. Two caveats, however, leave future interpretations un-
clear. First, both Berry and Clark are Superior Court of Pennsylvania
decisions. Majorana, on the other hand, is an opinion of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. It is questionable, therefore,
whether the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will adopt the seem-
ingly more complainant-protect ive analysis of the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania. Secondly, both Beny and Clark continue the "balanc-
ing" approach of Majorana in situations clearly outside of the scope
of the Pennsylvania rape shield statute. Thus, while Berry and Clark
both reach proper determinations, the method of analysis is flawed.
In each case, the evidence should have been excluded through the
plain language of the Pennsylvania rape shield statute. The imple-
mentation of a "balancing" approach contravenes the mandate of
the Pennsylvania rape shield statute and leaves a window of oppor-
tunity for the admission of evidence that the Pennsylvania General
Assembly intended to exclude. The judicial restraint shown by the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania may, in reality, be only an ad hoc
determination which coincidently comports with the purpose of the
Pennsylvania rape shield law.
270 Id., 512 A.2d at 1284-85.
271 Id. at 204, 512 A.2d at 1284.
272 Id. at 206, 512 A.2d at 1285.
273 Id., 512 A.2d at 1285.




The Connecticut General Assembly, in 1982, enacted an ex-
tremely detailed and functional rape shield law.275 From its incep-
tion, Connecticut courts have properly interpreted this statute.
Connecticut's rape shield statute attempts to explicitly outline the
situations in which evidence of the sexual conduct of the complain-
ant is admissible, while providing sufficient protection to satisfy con-
stitutional concerns. 276  The Connecticut General Assembly's
formal recognition of these competing concerns has aided the Con-
necticut judiciary in the application of the rape shield statute.
Though Connecticut courts are still required to determine what evi-
dence is critical to the maintenance of the defendant's constitutional
rights, the specificity of the statute, combined with the constitutional
rights provision of subsection (4), offers a large degree of symme-
try.277 Given the propriety of the Connecticut General Assembly's
efforts, the Connecticut judiciary has responded with a cogent anal-
ysis of the function of rape shield laws.
Two recent Appellate Court of Connecticut decisions impart
the proper judicial role in interpreting rape shield statutes. State v.
Jones involved an appeal from a conviction for sexual assault in the
first degree.278 The defendant challenged the trial court's exclusion
of a portion of his offer of proof.279 Specifically, the defendant
claimed that the proffered testimony was admissible under subsec-
275 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86f (West 1985) provides, in pertinent part:
In any prosecution for sexual assault... ,no evidence of the sexual conduct of the
victim may be admissible unless such evidence is (1) offered by the defendant on the
issue of whether the defendant was, with respect to the victim, the source of semen,
disease, pregnancy, or injury, or (2) offered by the defendant on the issue of credi-
bility of the victim, provided the victim has testified on direct examination as to his
or her sexual conduct, or (3) any evidence of sexual conduct with the defendant
offered by the defendant on the issue of consent by the victim, when consent is
raised as a defense by the defendant, or (4) otherwise so relevant and material to a
critical issue in the case that excluding it would violate the defendant's constitu-
tional rights. Such evidence shall be admissible only after a hearing on a motion to
offer such evidence containing an offer of proof.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 8 Conn. App. 44, 510 A.2d 467 (1986). From the State's evidence, the jury in-
ferred that the defendant and complainant met in a bar. As the complainant exited the
bar, the defendant followed her, forced her into his car, and drove the complainant to a
park, where he sexually assaulted her. Id. at 46, 510 A.2d at 468.
279 Id. at 47, 510 A.2d at 468-69. In the absence of the jury, the defendant made an
offer of proof of the testimony of Alvin Albert. Albert testified that he had known the
complainant for about four years and had had contact with her on about four occasions.
Albert stated that her reputation in the community was that "you buy her a drink and
then you have full liberty to do whatever you want when she comes out and says, 'Let's
go and party.' " He also testified that her reputation for veracity about sexual conduct
was negative. Id., 510 A.2d at 468-69.
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tion (4) of the Connecticut rape shield statute, which allows the ad-
mission of evidence relevant and material to a crucial issue in the
case.
28 0
Focusing on the defendant's offer of proof, the Appellate Court
of Connecticut interpreted the language of the rape shield statute to
"permit only specific instances of conduct and prohibit all proof of
reputation or personal opinion of the victim's sexual conduct." 28 1
TheJones court further explained that the strong policies of the stat-
ute could only be overcome by evidence which did not have the in-
herent infirmity of reputation or lay opinion evidence. 282
Jones exemplifies the proper boundaries of state court judicial
review. The Appellate Court of Connecticut closely examined both
the text and the function of the Connecticut rape shield statute.283
In determining that the Connecticut General Assembly intended to
exclude unreliable reputation evidence, the Jones court carefully
weighed the protection of the complainant with the constitutional
rights of the defendant. 284 The court's ultimate conclusion was
guided by the coherent structure of the Connecticut rape shield stat-
ute.28 5 Connecticut's well-drafted rape shield law, coupled with a
judiciary which assumed its proper function, resulted in a decision
which comports well with contemporary evidentiary and constitu-
tional concerns.
One month followingJones, the Appellate Court of Connecticut
extended its complainant-protective analysis in State v. Daniels.286
Following his conviction of sexual assault in the first degree, the de-
fendant asserted that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the
280 Id. at 47, 510 A.2d at 469. See also supra note 275 and accompanying text. In partic-
ular, the defendant argued that the excluded evidence showed a pattern of behavior of
the complainant which corroborated the defendant's testimony that the sexual inter-
course was consensual. The defendant also contended that the proffered evidence re-
garding the complainant's moral character was so critical to her credibility that its
exclusion violated the defendant's constitutional rights to confront witnesses and to
have a fair trial. Id., 510 A.2d at 469.
281 Id. at 48, 510 A.2d at 469 (citing TArr & LA PLrE, CONNEcTicuT EvIDENCE
§ 8.3g, 108-09 (Supp. 1985)). The court cited the longstanding judicial skepticism of
the reliability of reputation evidence in a fashion consistent with the policy purposes
underlying the enactment of the rape shield statute. Id., 510 A.2d at 469.
282 Id. 510 A.2d at 469. In Jones, the court found that the proffered testimony was so
tangentially related, if at all, to the version offered by the defendant, that it did not
violate the defendant's constitutional rights. The court also determined that the defend-
ant's final argument, that the offer of proof established the complainant's immoral char-
acter and, thus, critically affected her credibility, was without merit. Id. at 49, 510 A.2d
at 470.
283 See supra notes 278-82 and accompanying text.
284 See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
285 See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
286 8 Conn. App. 190, 512 A.2d 936 (1986).
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introduction of evidence of the complainant's prior sexual
conduct. 287
On appeal, the court's analysis again focused on subsection (4)
of the Connecticut rape shield statute.288 Noting that the cross-ex-
amination of the complainant spanned a period of two days, the
opinion found the inquiry sufficent for compliance with the sixth
amendment.28 9 Commenting on the probative value of the ex-
cluded evidence, the court categorically held that "the fact that the
victim may or may not have had prior consensual intercourse with
the defendant indicates nothing about a motive to falsely accuse him
of forcible sexual intercourse at a later time." 290
Additionally, the defendant contended that subsection (3) of
the rape shield statute, which admits evidence of sexual conduct be-
tween the complainant and the defendant when consent is at issue,
could not be read to exclude evidence of the prior sexual conduct of
the complainant in cases where consent has not been raised as a
defense. 291 The court noted that the Connecticut rape shield stat-
ute unequivocally states that evidence of prior sexual conduct may
be offered only when consent is raised as a defense.292 In dismissing
the defendant's contention, the opinion continued that "consent
was not truly an issue in the case." 293 To accept the defendant's
position, according to the court, would effectively emasculate the
rape shield statute to allow the introduction of evidence of prior
sexual conduct whenever a defendant is charged with sexual
assault.2 9
4
In reiterating the policy behind the rape shield law, the Appel-
late Court of Connecticut declared that the purpose of the statute is
287 Id. at 192, 512 A.2d at 937. The defendant, a twenty-one-year-old male, was con-
victed by jury of ordering a minor to undress the complainant, ordering the minor to
leave the house, and raping the complainant. The defendant attempted to testify that he
had had consensual intercourse with the complainant three days prior to the date on
which the sexual assault took place. The defendant asserted that the exclusion of such
evidence violated his sixth amendment right of confrontation because it would have
shown that the complainant was biased and had a motive to falsely accuse the defendant
of sexual assault. Id. at 193, 512 A.2d at 937-38.
288 Id. at 194, 512 A.2d at 938. See also supra note 275 and accompanying text.
289 Id., 512 A.2d at 938.
290 Id. at 194, 512 A.2d at 938. In affirming the trial court's determination that the
testimony the defendant sought to elicit was irrelevant to material issues in the case, the
court concluded that the defendant could not complain that his constitutional rights
were violated. Id.
291 Id. at 196, 512 A.2d at 939.
292 Id. at 197, 512 A.2d at 939-40.
293 Id., 512 A.2d at 939 (citing State v. Mastropetre, 175 Conn. 512, 400 A.2d 276
(1978)).
294 Id. at 196, 512 A.2d at 939.
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"specifically to bar or limit the use of prior sexual conduct of an
alleged victim of a sexual assault . -295 The statute, therefore,
must be read in such a way to uphold the integrity of the statutory
scheme and must be construed to carry out the intent of the legisla-
ture.29 6 The Daniels court concluded that the admission of evidence
of the complainant's past sexual conduct would subvert the policy
goals of the rape shield statute.2 97
The Daniels court extended the complainant-protective scope of
the Connecticut rape shield statute to encompass elements of bias
and motive, in its holding that evidence of the complainant's prior
sexual activity is not probative of her ability to fabricate rape
charges.2 98 Consistent with the Jones court's imputed exclusion of
opinion and reputation evidence, the Appellate Court of Connecti-
cut's approach in Daniels adheres to the language of the Connecticut
General Assembly in fashioning an appropriate balance between
competing complainant and defendant interests. 299 This rationale
parallels the novel methodology employed by Judge Clinton in his
scrutiny of the Texas rape shield statute.300 Connecticut courts,
however, enjoy the guidance of a far more specific rape shield law.
As a result, the Connecticut judiciary is absolved from much of the
inherent tension in the attempt to formulate a rational balance be-
tween the modem function of rape shield laws and the constitu-
tional privileges reserved for defendants. Connecticut courts,
therefore, possess the requisite freedom neccessary for effective ju-
dicial review in a setting attuned to legislative concerns. Jones and
Daniels exemplify the success of the Connecticut judiciary's and the
Connecticut General Assembly's attention to their respective roles.
IX. SYNOPSIS
The five states' rape shield laws surveyed above are representa-
tive of the vast array of the provisions in existence today.30' New
Hampshire's rape shield statute falls into the most restrictive cate-
gory of rape shield laws. 30 2 Rape shield laws in this grouping give
no explicit grant of discretion to state courts.30 3 Given this restraint
295 Id. at 197, 512 A.2d at 940 (citing State v. Cassidy, 3 Conn. App. 374, 489 A.2d
386 (1982), cert. denied, 196 Conn. 803, 492 A.2d. 1239 (1986).
296 Id. at 196, 512 A.2d at 939.
297 Id. at 197, 512 A.2d at 940.
298 See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
300 See supra notes 163-66.
301 See supra notes 47-62 and accompanying text.
302 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. See also infra Table IV, app.
303 See infra Table IV, app.
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on judicial power, courts find it difficult to reconcile the constitu-
tional privileges of the complainant and the constitutional rights of
the defendant. 30 4 State courts, when perceiving that one of these
two competing interests is of paramount importance, contradict the
"plain meaning" of the statute in order to impartially administer
justice.30 5 This judicial super-legislative function produces a wide
range of unpredictable results. Rape shield laws in this category,
therefore, fail to achieve the optimal allocation of legislative and ju-
dicial functions.
At the other end of the spectrum are rape shield laws which
liberally admit evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity
and propensity for unchastity under traditional evidentiary stan-
dards. 30 6 These types of laws are exemplified by the Texas rape
shield statute which was in effect prior to September 1, 1986, as well
as the current Texas rule of evidence.3 0 7 Yet, rape shield laws which
grant state courts excessive discretion present many of the same
problems as does New Hampshire's restrictive rape shield stat-
ute.30 8 State courts, given wide discretion in the absence of legisla-
tive guidance, undertake amorphous and conflicting analyses. 30 9 As
with restrictive rape shield laws, statutes which provide a vast
amount of judicial discretion produce no cognizable trends of
decisions.
The most functional rape shield laws are those which fall into
the intermediate gradation and which foist judicial discretion upon
state courts while providing a substantial amount of statutory gui-
dance.3 10 Missouri's rape shield statute provides courts in that state
with a semblance of direction. 3 1 1 Missouri courts, however, failed to
acknowlege this indicator of legislative intent until 1986.312 Simi-
larly, Pennsylvania's rape shield statute offers a more adequate
statement of the intent of the Pennsylvania General Assembly.3 13
Yet, the Pennsylvania statute fails to enumerate with sufficient speci-
ficity the criteria for admissibility of evidence of the complainant's
past sexual activity and propensity for unchastity.31 4 In contrast, the
304 See supra notes 86-149 and accompanying text.
305 Id.
306 See supra note 89. See also infra Table I, app.
307 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
308 See supra notes 150-196 and accompanying text.
309 Id.
310 See infra Table V, app.
311 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
312 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
313 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
314 See supra notes 226-274 and accompanying text.
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legislative specificity of the Connecticut rape shield statute provides
the requisite guidance for the state courts of Connecticut.3 15 Con-
necticut courts are afforded "directed discretion" when balancing
the competing interests of the complainant and the defendant. The
result is a series of opinions in Connecticut which most effectively
accomplishes the dual goals of rape shield statutes-protecting the
rape complainant from being subjected to unnecessary trauma at
discovery and in the courtroom and adequately maintaining the con-
stitutional protection of the rights of the defendant.
Rape shield laws which fall into this intermediate gradation
hold the most promise as the future paradigm for state enactments.
In providing both legislative guidance and in camera hearing proce-
dures, state legislatures provide sufficiently detailed guidance for
the judicial "balancing" process. It is this type of rape shield law
which strikes the appropriate equilibrium between legislative ac-
countability and delegation of judicial discretion.
X. CONCLUSION
State courts confront a formidable task when they are forced to
interpret poorly-drafted and ambiguous rape shield laws. The lin-
guistic and structural differences among the texts of such provisions
often force state judiciaries to impart a great degree of creativity
into opinions. Implicit in these analyses is the sound judicial con-
cern for properly effectuating the competing interests of the rape
complainant and the defendant. The modem thrust of rape shield
laws may infringe upon the due process and confrontation privi-
leges afforded to the defendant. Relying on this tenet, state courts
often apply an insufficient depth of analysis while abridging the pro-
tection from unnecessary harassment and embarrassment that rape
shield laws are designed to provide to complainants. By engaging in
this process, however, state judiciaries create a disequilibrium which
overprotects the constitutional rights of defendants. By unwittingly
falling prey to the unsubstantiated evidentiary assumptions of the
Victorian era, these analyses emasculate the legislative intent under-
lying the enactment of rape shield laws.
In order to prevent this anomalous result, state legislatures and
courts must engage in a cooperative venture. First, state legislatures
should amend rape shield laws to present a cogent textual account
of the function of such provisions. Secondly, state courts must exer-
cise judicial restraint in interpreting rape shield laws. When con-
fonting an ambiguous rape shield law, courts should focus on the
315 See supra notes 275 and accompanying text.
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purpose of such evidentiary restrictions. Rape shield laws are inher-
ently exclusionary in nature. Judicial opining must recognize this
factor and not be drawn into the labyrinth of outdated, chauvinistic
concerns. When presented with a facially coherent rape shield law,
state courts must strive to effectuate the intent of the statute. The
constitutional rights of the defendant, while symmetrically valued,
should not be the major focus of the analysis. Emphasis on the de-
fendant often results in unmerited overprotection of the defendant
at the expense of the effectiveness of the rape shield law. As with all
evidentiary restrictions, a degree of legislative deference is required
in judicial construction. Such legislative and judicial cooperation, if
employed, will foster an environment which permits rape shield laws
to attain their intended goals while concordantly maintaining the
valued American protection of the constitutional rights of
defendants.
ANDREW Z. SOSHNICK
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
STATUTES THAT ADMIT SEXUAL HISTORY EVIDENCE UNDER
TRADITIONAL EVIDENCE RULES REQUIRING THAT RELEVANCE
OUTWEIGH PREJDICIAL EFFECT
Statute Hearing Test for Admissibility
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3525 Before trial (motion due ten Relevant and not otherwise
(Supp. 1986). days before trial unless waived inadmissible.
by the court).
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-511(4) Before trial. None specified.
(1985).
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-18 Before introduction of evidence None specified.
(1981). of sexual conduct with others
than the defendant.
S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-22-15 Before introduction. Relevance and materiality.
(1979).
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2- Before trial (motion due ten Relevance substantially out-
312(1983). days before trial). weighs prejudice.
TABLE II
STATUTES THAT GENERALLY ALLOW SEXUAL HISTORY EVIDENCE
BUT REQUIRE A HEARING ON ADMISSmmITY FOR SOME USES OF
THIS EVIDENCE
Statute Evidence Admissible Evidence Admissible Test for Admissibility
Without A Hearing Only After A Hearing
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3- Prior or subsequent Any other evidence Relevant.
407 (Supp. 1986). conduct with the ac- when consent is at
cused; evidence that issue.
another committed the
act.
Fla. Stat. Ann. Past conduct with the Source of semen, preg- Relevant."
§ 794.022 (West Supp. accused. nancy, or disease; pat-
1987). tern of conduct indicat-
ing consent.
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law Specific instances of Any other evidence. Relevant and admissi-
§ 60.42 (McKinney past conduct with the ble in the interests of
1981). accused; complainant's justice.
prostitution within the
past three years; rebut-
tal of state's evidence
of complainant's con-
duct or of source of
semen, pregnancy, or
disease.
Although the statute does not specify that relevance must outweigh prejudicial effect, judges usually
apply this balancing test.
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TABLE III
STATUTES THAT GIVE THE TRIAL JUDGE GENERAL DISCRETION To
ADMIT SEXUAL HISTORY EVIDENCE AFTER A HEARING, BUT LIMIT
SUCH DISCRETION IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
Statute Hearing Test for Admissibility Situations when
Inadmissible
Alaska Stat. Any time before or af- Relevance not out- Sexual conduct occur-
§ 12.45.045 (Supp. ter trial, weighed by prejudice ring more than one
1986). or unwarranted inva- year before crime (re-
sion of victim's privacy. buttable presumption).
Cal. Evid. Code § 782 Before introduction. Relevance not out- Some types of conduct
(West Supp. 1987). weighed by prejudice. offered to show con-
sent, see infra Table
IV.
Del. Code Ann. § 3508 Before introduction. Relevance not out- Some types of conduct
(1979)." weighed by prejudice. offered to show con-
sent, see infra Table
IV.
Nev. Rev. Stat. Before introduction. Relevance not substan- Some types of conduct
§ 48.069 (Michie tially outweighed by offered to impeach
1986)." prejudice. credibility, see infra Ta-
ble IV.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A- Before introduction. Relevance not out- Conduct occurring
84A-32.1 (West Supp, weighed by prejudice more than one year
1987). or unwarranted inva- before crime (rebutta-
sion of victim's privacy. ble presumption).
N.D. Cent. Code Before introduction. Relevance not out- Some types of conduct
§ 12.1-20-15 (1986).' weighed by prejudice. offered to show con-
sent, see infra Table
IV.
This statute applies only to evidence to show consent. A companion statute covers evidence offered to
impeach the complainant's credibility, see infra Table IV.
This statute applies only to evidence offered to impeach the complainant's credibility. A companion
statute covers evidence offered on the consent issue, see infra Table IV.
TABLE IV
STATUTES THAT GENERALLY PROHIBIT THE INTRODUCTION OF
SEXUAL HISTORY EVIDENCE EXCEPT IN LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES.
THERE Is No JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND No DISTINCTION
BETWEEN THE TYPE OF EVIDENCE




Ala. Code § 12-21-203 Admissible.
(Supp. 1986).











Del. Code Ann. tit. 11,
§ 3509 (1979)."
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch 38,
§ 115-7 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1987).
La. Rev. Stat. Ann.





N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 632-A:6 (1986).
N.D. Cent. Code § 12-
1-20-14 (1986)."
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22,






















Evidence may be ad-
missible to show con-
sent, see supra Table
III.
None.
Evidence may be used
to impeach credibility,
see supra Table I1.
Sexual conduct of the
victim in the presence
of the accused.
This statute applies only to evidence offered to show consent. A companion statute covers evidence
offered to impeach the complainant's credibility, see supra Table III.
This statute applies only to evidence offered to impeach the complainant's credibility. A companion
statute covers evidence offered to show consent, see supra Table II.
TABLE V
STATUTES THAT GENERALLY PROHIBIT SEXUAL HISTORY EVIDENCE,
EXCEPT IN A FEw SPECIFICALLY DEFINED SITUATIONS, AND EVEN
THEN ONLY AFTER A HEARING To DETERMINE ADMISSIBILITY



















































Opinion and Past conduct with
evidence, accused, source of
semen, or injury.
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Idaho R. Evid. Motion due five Relevance out- Opinion and rep- Past conduct with
412 (1985). days before trial, weighs prejudice. utation evidence, accused, source of
unless new semen, or injury.
evidence.
Ind. Code Ann. Motion due ten Relevance out- Opinion and rep- Past conduct with
§ 85-37-4-4 (West days before trial, weighs prejudice. utation evidence, accused, specific
1986). unless good cause instances of con-
shown, duct that show
another commit-
ted the act.
Iowa R. Evid. 412 Motion due fif- Relevance out- Opinion and rep- Past conduct with
(1983). teen days before weighs prejudice. utation evidence, accused, source of
trial, unless new semen, or injury.
evidence.
Motion due two Relevance out-












Before trial, un- Relevance out- Opinion and rep- Past conduct with
less good cause weighs prejudice. utation evidence, accused; source of










Before Relevance out- Reputation Conduct with ac-








Mich. Comp. Motion due ten Relevance out-
Laws Ann. days after arraign- weighs prejudice.
§ 750.520j (West ment, except new-
Supp. 1987). ly discovered
evidence.
Minn. Stat. Ann. Before trial, un- Relevance out-






























art. 27, § 461A
(Supp. 1985).
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(Supp. 1985).








18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 3104 (Pur-
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Tex. R. Evid. 412
(1986).
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
13, § 3255 (Supp.
1986).
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duct an issue at
trial.
Past conduct with
accused; source of
semen, disease,
pregnancy, or in-
jury; prior un-
truthful allegation
of sexual assault.
